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THE LIMITS OF SECOND AMENDMENT 
ORIGINALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASE FOR GUN CONTROL 
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL

 
The Second Amendment is the only provision in the Bill of Rights with 
a preamble: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”1 The relationship between the Second Amendment’s preamble 
and its operative clause is far from obvious; yet, it has critical implications 
for the future of gun control.  
For decades, Second Amendment jurisprudence was dominated by 
United States v. Miller,
2
 in which the Court rejected a constitutional attack 
on a federal statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of a short-
barrel shotgun by observing that a short-barrel shotgun has no 
“relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”3 
Lower courts generally “invoke[d] Miller with vehemence and regularity 
in dismissing, out of hand, challenges to the various pieces of gun control 
legislation.”4  
This changed with the 5–4 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.5 
Assessing the constitutionality of an ordinance banning the possession of 
handguns and requiring that firearms remain unloaded and disassembled 
or locked, the Court began by stating its interpretive methodology:  
[W]e are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were 
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 3. Id. at 178. 
 4. Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of 
United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 998 (1996). 
 5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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meaning.” Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic 
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not 
have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.
6
  
Relying on evidence of the meaning of the terms of the Second 
Amendment in the framing era, the Court concluded that the “right of the 
people” referred to an individual right,7 while “Arms” included “all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding,”8 but excluded “dangerous and 
unusual weapons.”9 The right to “keep” arms, the Court concluded, meant 
the right to possess them,
10
 and the right to “bear” arms meant the right to 
“carry[] for a particular purpose—confrontation.”11 As for the preamble, 
the Court concluded that it would not have been understood in the framing 
era to “limit or expand the scope of the operative clause,” but instead 
merely “announce[d] the purpose for which the right was codified: to 
prevent elimination of the militia.”12 As for Miller, the Court concluded 
that it should be understood as holding “only that the Second Amendment 
does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”13 The Court 
then held that the right to keep and bear arms was infringed by the 
District’s prohibition on the registration and possession of handguns,14 as 
well as its requirement that firearms be locked or otherwise stored in an 
inoperable condition.
15
  
At first blush, Heller’s originalist methodology appears to embrace a 
largely unqualified right of every person to possess and carry any firearm 
in common civilian use. Its practical significance grew when, two years 
later, a majority of the Court concluded that the Second Amendment’s 
protections are fully applicable to state and local gun-control laws by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16
 Heller’s importance was 
 
 
 6. Id. at 576–77 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) (citations 
omitted) (second brackets in original).  
 7. Id. at 579–81, 592. 
 8. Id. at 582. 
 9. Id. at 627. 
 10. Id. at 582. 
 11. Id. at 584.  
 12. Id. at 578, 599. 
 13. Id. at 625. 
 14. Id. at 628–31. 
 15. Id. at 630. 
 16. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (plurality opinion) (relying on 
the Due Process Clause); id. at 839–58 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
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methodological as well. Justice Scalia, the author of Heller, has long been 
an advocate of originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.
17
 His 
advocacy of originalism, which “regards the discoverable meaning of the 
Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes 
of constitutional interpretation in the present,”18 is ultimately premised on 
his view about the proper way to divine the meaning of a text: 
“originalism remains the normal, natural approach to understanding 
anything that has been said or written in the past.”19 Justice Scalia has 
added that, in his view, treating legal rules as having evolving content to 
be fleshed out by judicial decision “is preeminently a common-law way of 
making law, and not the way of construing a democratically adopted 
text.”20 In this, Justice Scalia is not alone; originalists, whatever their 
differences, frequently defend their methodology as the proper approach 
for ascertaining the meaning of a legal text.
21
  
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–64 
(1989). 
 18. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004). 
Lawrence Solum has elaborated: 
[M]ost or almost all originalists agree that original meaning was fixed or determined at the 
time each provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. We might call this idea the 
fixation thesis. It is no surprise that originalists agree on the fixation thesis. The term 
“originalism” was coined to describe a family of textualist and intentionalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation and construction that were associated with phrases like “original 
intentions,” “original meaning,” and “original understanding.” These phrases and the word 
“originalist” share the root word “origin.” The idea that meaning is fixed at the time of 
origination for each constitutional provision serves as the common denominator for all of 
these expressions. 
Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM]. Justice 
Scalia has similarly described originalism as the consequence of what he has called the “Fixed-
Meaning Canon”: “Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.” ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER: READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78 (2012).  
 19. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 18, at 82. 
 20. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION]. 
 21. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92–117 (2004); GREGORY 
BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 67–90 (1992); 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 28–53 (1994); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212 (1999); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some 
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103–07 (1991); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. 
Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution”, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–259 (1987); Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the 
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Heller has been called “the most explicitly and self-consciously 
originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.”22 Heller offered 
Justice Scalia an inviting opportunity to inject originalism into 
constitutional adjudication. Although Justice Scalia is reluctant to 
repudiate well-settled nonoriginalist precedent by virtue of his respect for 
the doctrine of stare decisis,
23
 Second Amendment jurisprudence was 
unencumbered by numerous nonorginalist precedents. By cabining 
Miller—the only important Second Amendment precedent before Heller—
as a case about unusual weapons, Justice Scalia had little difficulty in 
concluding that “nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the 
original understanding of the Second Amendment.”24 Accordingly, the 
path was clear to an originalist Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
In Heller, the Court pointedly refused to adopt any standard of judicial 
scrutiny by which a challenged gun-control law could be tested to 
determine if it was sufficiently justified, although it did reject the view that 
 
 
Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); Christopher R. Green, “This 
Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1607, 1641–57 (2009); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–36 (1988); Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting 
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48 (2003); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and 
Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of 
Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the 
Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056–62 (2006); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 540–45 (1998); Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011).  
 22. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
246, 246 (2008). 
 23. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 18, at 87, 411–14; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 20, at 129, 138–40. Nonorginalist precedent poses difficult 
questions for those who advocate both originalism and the virtues of stare decisis. Although some 
originalists largely reject nonoriginalist precedent, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with 
Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 262–69 (2005); Steven G. 
Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 947 (2008); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
289, 289 (2005); others are more sympathetic to nonoriginalist precedent, at least in some 
circumstances. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Essay, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare 
Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444–61 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 823–50 (2009); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 739–72 (1988); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, 
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 195–96 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An 
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 
N.M. L. REV. 419, 436–79 (2006). 
 24. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008). 
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a challenged regulation need only to have a rational basis, as well as the 
interest-balancing test Justice Breyer advocated in dissent.
25
 Given 
Heller’s originalism, this should be unsurprising; the advocates of 
balancing tests and standards of scrutiny do not claim that they have any 
basis in the original meaning of the Constitution’s text.26 Thus, Heller 
seemed to promise the dawn of Second Amendment originalism 
unencumbered by the nonoriginalist balancing tests and standards of 
scrutiny common in other areas of constitutional law, but lacking any 
grounding in the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. 
Commentators have provided many helpful, if often conflicting, 
assessments of Heller’s conclusions regarding the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment.
27
 Much less scholarly attention has been paid to the 
Second Amendment jurisprudence emerging in Heller’s wake. This 
Article takes Heller’s conclusions about the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment as given and assesses whether they have produced—
or even are capable of producing—an authentically originalist Second 
Amendment jurisprudence. In Heller’s wake, the outlines of a new 
jurisprudence—one that countenances surprisingly robust regulatory 
authority and in which originalism plays a surprisingly limited role—are 
starting to become clear. The discussion that follows seeks to explicate 
and defend this emerging jurisprudence in terms of the relationship 
between the Second Amendment’s preamble and its operative clause. It 
explores, as well, the constitutional case for a robust regime of gun 
control. 
 
 
 25. Id. at 628 n.27, 634–35. 
 26. For a helpful discussion, albeit predating Heller, of the origins and character of the various 
approaches to judicial review and standards of scrutiny employed in other areas of constitutional law 
and how they might be applied to the Second Amendment, see Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second 
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 693–705 (2007). 
 27. For examples, see Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 145 (2008); Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the 
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1727 (2012); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well 
Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267 (2008); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second 
Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written 
Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009); Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009); Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1377 (2009); William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s 
Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349 (2009); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or 
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); David C. 
Williams, Death to Tyrants: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Uses of Guns, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 
(2008). 
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Part I examines the problems with Heller’s effort to ground 
constitutional adjudication in the original meaning of constitutional text. 
As Part I explains, nonoriginalism lurks in Heller, which helps to explain 
why lower courts have increasingly utilized the type of balancing tests and 
standards of scrutiny seemingly eschewed by Heller. Part II reviews and 
ultimately dismisses the efforts to salvage an originalist Second 
Amendment jurisprudence after Heller, casting doubt on the utility of 
originalism to produce a coherent Second Amendment jurisprudence. Part 
III then offers an account that accommodates both the right recognized in 
Heller and comprehensive regulatory power over firearms by focusing on 
the relationship between the Second Amendment’s preamble and its 
operative clause. It concludes that there is a textual basis in the Second 
Amendment for both firearms rights and regulation, while acknowledging 
that there is little in the original meaning of the Second Amendment that 
helps to identify the boundary between rights and regulatory authority. 
Instead, Part III argues that common-law methodology—what originalists 
often call constitutional construction and nonoriginalists celebrate as 
living constitutionalism—is up to the task. Existing nonorginalist 
constitutional doctrine supplies the framework for constructing a post-
Heller Second Amendment jurisprudence. Part III then applies this 
framework and demonstrates that the Second Amendment poses little 
obstacle to comprehensive firearms regulation. 
I. THE UNRAVELING OF HELLER’S SECOND AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 
At first blush, Heller’s account of the Second Amendment seems 
straightforwardly hostile towards firearms regulation. The Court 
concluded that the right to keep and bear arms was originally understood 
as an “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”28 Although the Court offered no account of the original 
meaning of an “infringe[ment]” of this right, the first edition of Webster’s 
American Dictionary of the English Language, which Justice Scalia 
frequently consults to ascertain the original meaning of eighteenth-century 
constitutional text,
29
 including in Heller itself,
30
 defined “infringed” as 
 
 
 28. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 29. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 390–91 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
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“[b]roken, violated, transgressed.”31 Other framing-era sources are to 
similar effect.
32
 Accordingly, the original meaning of the command in the 
Second Amendment’s operative clause that the right to keep and bear arms 
“shall not be infringed” suggests that no individual can be denied the right 
to possess or carry firearms in common civilian use in case of 
confrontation. Thus, some have argued that the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment contemplates an expansive right to possess and carry 
arms.
33
 
Yet, much in Heller actually suggests that the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s operative clause tells us little about the scope of 
permissible firearms regulation. This becomes clear through an 
examination of Heller’s discussion of permissible firearms regulation, its 
precise holding, and its application in the lower courts. 
A. Heller’s Dicta on Permissible Firearms Regulation 
Heller went to some lengths to emphasize that limitations on the right 
to keep and bear arms—that is, to possess and carry firearms in case of 
confrontation—are consistent with the Second Amendment. The Court 
wrote: “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is 
not unlimited.”34 “For example,” the Court observed, “the majority of the 
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on 
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or 
state analogues.”35 Moreover,  
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
 
 
U.S. 316, 347 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 
(1991); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581, 582, 584, 595.  
 31. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 110 (1828). 
 32. See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE 
WORDS ARE DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS mxlvi (6th ed. 1785) (“To violate; to break laws or 
contracts.”). 
 33. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 328–30 (2008); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1404–09. 
 34. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 35. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.
36
  
The Court added that it “identif[ied] these presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”37 
A number of respected commentators have doubted that Heller’s list of 
“presumptively lawful” regulatory measures reflects the original meaning 
of the Second Amendment.
38
 Indeed, the Court’s discussion of 
presumptively lawful gun-control measures is in considerable tension with 
its conclusions regarding the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause. For example, if the operative clause 
recognizes an individual right to possess and carry in case of confrontation 
all firearms in common civilian use, then there would seemingly be no 
textual basis to deprive some individuals of that right on the basis of a 
prior conviction or mental illness or to prevent individuals from exercising 
the right to carry firearms if concealed or in “sensitive places.” While 
there may be good policy reasons for such regulations, Heller states that 
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood 
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures 
or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”39 In this fashion, 
Heller’s originalism breaks down. There may be some basis on which to 
sustain the regulations that Heller describes as presumptively lawful, but it 
cannot be found in Heller’s account of the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause. 
Yet, it may be perilous to place too much weight on Heller’s discussion 
of presumptively lawful gun control. This discussion was, after all, only 
dicta unnecessary to the Court’s holding; Heller sought only “to enjoin the 
 
 
 36. Id. at 626–27.  
 37. Id. at 627 n.26. When the Court subsequently concluded that the Second Amendment is 
applicable to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, four of the five Justices 
in the majority referred to Heller’s discussion of presumptively lawful regulations, stating: “We repeat 
those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does 
not imperil every law regulating firearms.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) 
(opinion of Alito, J.). 
 38. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: 
Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1064–66 (2009); 
Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1373–79 (2009); Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional 
Interpretation: Originalism’s Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1427 (2009); Lund, supra note 27, at 
1356–62; Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 729–32 (2012); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 
1562–65 (2009). Even Heller’s exclusion of “dangerous and unusual” weapons from Second 
Amendment protection has questionable historical support. See Lund, supra note 27, at 1362–64. 
 39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 1195 
 
 
 
 
city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns . . . and the 
trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of ‘functional 
firearms within the home.’”40 Moreover, in its discussion of presumptively 
lawful regulations, the Court acknowledged that it “d[id] not undertake an 
exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment,” and added that “there will be time enough to expound upon 
the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and 
when those exceptions come before us.”41 At most, Heller’s dicta erect a 
presumption that can, presumably, be rebutted. Still, Heller’s precise 
holding, no less than its dicta on permissible firearms regulation, reflects 
the limits of Second Amendment originalism, as we shall now see. 
B. Heller’s Holding 
Since Heller explained that the Second Amendment’s operative clause 
conferred an individual right to possess and carry in case of confrontation 
any firearm in common civilian use, it should have been a simple matter to 
invalidate the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of 
handguns and their use within the home. If one has the right to possess and 
carry in case of confrontation any firearm in common civilian use, then the 
invalidity of the challenged regulations should have been plain. The 
Court’s precise holding, however, was not nearly so straightforward. 
Indeed, the Court’s assessment of the constitutionality of the ordinance 
does not rest on the Court’s account of the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment. Instead, it seems to rest on nonoriginalist considerations.  
The Court introduced its discussion of the challenged ordinance by 
observing that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right,” adding that the District of Columbia’s 
“handgun ban amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of ‘arms’ that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose,” and 
that the ban “extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense 
of self, family, and property is most acute.”42 The Court noted that “[f]ew 
laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction 
of the District’s handgun ban. And some of those few have been struck 
down.”43 Inasmuch as “the American people have considered the handgun 
 
 
 40. Id. at 576. Heller also challenged the District’s requirement that firearms be licensed, but the 
Court found it unnecessary to reach that provision. Id. at 630–31. 
 41. Id. at 626, 635. 
 42. Id. at 628.  
 43. Id. at 629.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to be the quintessential self-defense weapon,” it follows, the Court wrote, 
that “a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”44 As for the trigger-
lock requirement, because it required that “firearms in the home be 
rendered and kept inoperable at all times,” this prohibition “makes it 
impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense and is hence unconstitutional.”45 
Thus, the Court invalidated the District’s ordinance not on the ground 
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to possess and 
carry firearms in common civilian use, but because the District’s 
ordinance imposed a particularly severe burden on a right of armed 
defense. Some commentators have argued that Heller is best read as 
protecting a core right to possess and use firearms for lawful defense of 
the home, while leaving open the possibility of greater restrictions on 
liberty interests at a distance from that core right.
46
 Indeed, it is plain that 
the Court regarded lawful, armed defense as the core of the Second 
Amendment right; it described lawful self-defense as “the central 
component of the right itself” and the Amendment’s “core lawful 
purpose,” and concluded that the Amendment “surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”47 The Court even adverted to the burden 
imposed by the challenged regulations, contrasting it with the more 
modest burden imposed by framing-era regulations.
48
 For present 
purposes, however, what is most significant is that none of this can be 
deduced from the Court’s explication of the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s text, which says not a word about self-defense or 
the importance of hearth and home.
49
 Instead, according to Heller, the 
original meaning of the right to “keep and bear arms” was to confer an 
individual right to possess and carry in case of confrontation firearms in 
common civilian use without apparent qualification. Heller’s discussion of 
the centrality of self-defense and the defense of the home, and the extent to 
 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 630. 
 46. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 975–77, 978–79 (2009); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 419, 423–28 (2009). 
 47. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 630, 635. 
 48. Id. at 632 (noting that framing-era firearms safety laws “d[id] not remotely burden the right 
of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns”). 
 49. To be sure, the text refers, in the preamble, to “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State,” U.S. CONST. amend. II, which the Court acknowledged was a reference 
not to an individual right of self-defense, but “meant ‘security of a free polity.’” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
597. 
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which a challenged regulation impinges on the interest in such defense, 
has no apparent footing in the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause.50 
C. Heller in the Lower Courts 
Heller’s focus on the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause suggests that in applying it, courts need only ask whether 
a challenged regulation infringes an individual’s right to possess and carry 
firearms in common civilian use. Yet, original meaning has rarely played a 
decisive role in the Second Amendment jurisprudence that has developed 
in the lower courts following Heller. 
One obstacle to judicial reliance on original meaning when assessing 
the validity of a challenged regulation is that courts often find the relevant 
historical evidence to be uncertain or inconclusive.
51
 Beyond that, serious 
difficulties lurk in defining Second Amendment rights by reference to 
Heller’s definition of the right to keep and bear arms.  
First, an effort to define the scope of Second Amendment protection in 
terms of the original meaning of the operative clause could in many cases 
inappropriately circumscribe constitutional protection. Some regulations, 
such as laws prohibiting the sale of ammunition, or target practice, do not 
by their terms infringe the right to “keep” or “bear” “arms” under the 
original meaning of those terms as defined in Heller, yet they could 
impose enormous and unjustified burdens on Second Amendment rights.
52
 
 
 
 50. One might argue that the text’s reference to a right to “bear” arms implies a right to carry 
firearms only for lawful purposes, but Heller undermines that view. The Court adopted a definition of 
the term “bear” first advanced by Justice Ginsburg in a case interpreting a federal statute that provides 
for an enhanced sentence for individuals who carry a firearm during the commission of a crime, 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)), and concluded that the phrase “bear arms” “implies that the carrying of the weapon is for 
the purpose offensive or defensive action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2012) (carrying 
firearms in public); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (selling handguns to juveniles); United States v. 
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 2012) (ability of noncitizens to keep and bear 
arms); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–81 (4th Cir. 2010) (prohibition on possession of 
firearms by domestic-violence misdemeanants); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 
2010) (prohibition on possession of firearms by convicted felons). 
 52. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Anti-Evasion Doctrines and the Second Amendment, 81 
TENN. L. REV. 551, 559–60 (2014) (“At a minimum, laws that seek to make it extremely difficult or 
unreasonably expensive to obtain or maintain a gun at home, or which make it difficult to have the gun 
available and operable for self-defense ought to raise constitutional concerns.”); Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, Essay, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
247, 248–49 (2012) (“If the core right is, as indicated in District of Columbia v. Heller, the right to 
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Indeed, such laws have been invalidated since Heller.
53
 Yet, nothing in the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause as 
articulated in Heller offers a methodology for determining what types of 
burdens on the right to keep and bear arms are impermissible.  
Second, a focus on the original meaning of the operative clause does 
little to explain Heller’s discussion of permissible firearms regulation. 
Heller’s discussion of presumptively valid regulation has no apparent 
basis in the original meaning of the operative clause, but it does suggest 
that the Second Amendment preserves considerable regulatory power. 
Indeed, a number of courts have reasoned that regulations that fall within 
the categories branded presumptively lawful in Heller should be sustained 
even when they prevent individuals from possessing or carrying firearms 
in common civilian use.
54
 Still, there are perils in placing too much weight 
on this dictum, and a number of courts have refused to treat it as 
dispositive.
55
 Yet, Heller’s precise holding seems to rest on the extent to 
which the District of Columbia’s ordinance burdened a core constitutional 
interest in armed defense of the home, even though this approach has no 
apparent grounding in the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause.  
 
 
possess firearms for defense of self, family, and home, then the auxiliary protections that might matter 
most would be those that would make that right practicable in the real world.” (footnote omitted)). 
 53. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–10 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting 
preliminary injunction against law prohibiting firing ranges); Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 
1237, 1243–45 (D.C. 2010) (invalidating prohibition on the possession of ammunition).  
 54. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210–12 (10th Cir. 2013) (concealed carry); 
Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2012) (commercial sales); United States v. Moore, 
666 F.3d 313, 316–19 (4th Cir. 2012) (convicted felons); United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 
& n.3 (1st Cir. 2012) (mentally ill); United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 112–13 & n.1 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (convicted felons); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 170–75 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); 
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Williams, 616 F.3d at 691–94 
(same); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); People v. Brown, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 818–
21 (Ct. App. 2014) (short-barrel shotguns); City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 652–
53 (Ct. App. 2013) (mentally ill); People v. Ellison, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 245, 249–52 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(concealed carry); Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 164–66 (D.C. 2011) (same); People v. 
Garvin, 994 N.E.2d 1076, 1083–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (convicted felons); State v. Knight, 241 P.3d 
120, 132–33 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (same); State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 793–98 (Minn. 2013) 
(convicted felons); Pohlabel v. State, 268 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Nev. 2012) (same); People v. Johnson, 974 
N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (App. Div. 2013) (convicted felons); Kelly v. Riley, 733 S.E.2d 194, 198–99 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2012) (concealed carry); In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1025–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (mentally 
ill); Caba v. Weaknecht, 64 A.3d 39, 51–53 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2013) (concealed carry); Perry v. State 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 A.3d 942, 955 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (sensitive places); DiGiacinto v. 
Rectors & Visitors of Geo. Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 369–70 (Va. 2011) (same). 
 55. See, e.g., Moore, 666 F.3d at 319; Barton, 633 F.3d at 172–73; Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–93; 
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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Scholars have wrestled with the complexities lurking in Heller’s 
precise holding. In light of its apparent focus on the extent to which a 
challenged regulation impairs a core Second Amendment interest in lawful 
armed defense, a number of scholars have argued that Heller is best 
understood as requiring inquiry into the extent to which a challenged 
regulation burdens core Second Amendment rights as compared to its 
regulatory justification, though none have claimed any basis for this 
approach in the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative 
clause.
56
 Others have offered alternate proposals to govern judicial review 
of challenged gun-control laws, including enhanced rational-basis 
review,
57
 a stringent form of reasonableness review,
58
 clear and convincing 
evidence that a challenged regulation enhances safety,
59
 intermediate 
scrutiny requiring that the government demonstrate the substantial efficacy 
of a challenged regulation,
60
 or strict scrutiny for regulations that implicate 
core Second Amendment interests and some form of balancing test for 
other challenged laws.
61
 Notably, none of these proposals claim any 
 
 
 56. See, e.g., James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights with 
Responsibilities and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 872–73 (2014); Nelson Lund, Second 
Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1634–35 (2012); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, 
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 79–84 (2009); 
Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 517–20 (2012); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1443, 1448–73 (2009). 
 57. See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment Right—Post-Heller 
Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 66–71 (2009). 
 58. See, e.g., Fleming & McClain, supra note 56, at 869–72; Larson, supra note 38, at 1385–86; 
Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 407–08 (2009). 
 59. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Second Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1442–
43 (2009). 
 60. See, e.g., David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of Three 
Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1454–57 (2014); Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment 
Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 587–93 (2009); Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards: The 
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. 
Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 259, 286–87 (2009); Sarah Perkins, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second 
Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1079–90 (2010); Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In 
Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1160–69 
(2011).  
 61. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 46, at 431–32; Lindsay Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. 
Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD. L. REV. 889, 904–13 (2009); Jeff 
Golimowski, Note, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a Post-Heller World, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1613–19 (2012); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second 
Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1570–73 
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footing in the original meaning of the Second Amendment as described in 
Heller. 
Indeed, originalism has had a limited role in post-Heller Second 
Amendment litigation. The emerging consensus in the lower courts uses 
original meaning only as a threshold test, which screens out some claims, 
but contemplates that laws—even those limiting the extent to which 
individuals can exercise the textually recognized right to keep and bear 
arms—may be sustained upon sufficient justification. The prevailing 
approach involves a two-pronged inquiry: 
The first question is “whether the challenged law imposes a burden 
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee.” This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the 
conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the right 
at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is 
valid. If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within 
the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, 
then we move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of 
means-end scrutiny.
62
 
The first prong of this test is ostensibly originalist, although it functions 
only to weed out claims that are considered outside the scope of 
constitutional protection. Accordingly, historical evidence is never alone 
sufficient to sustain a Second Amendment claim. Instead, if the first prong 
is satisfied, courts proceed to means-end scrutiny. Thus, in actual practice, 
the first prong, while ostensibly focused on historical evidence of original 
meaning, operates only to defeat Second Amendment claims.
63
 
 
 
(2009); Michael J. Habib, Note, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald and Heller and the 
Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1365–74 (2012). 
 62. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)). Accord, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 
735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874–75 (4th Cir. 
2013); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); 
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 
1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89; Hertz v. Bennett, 751 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ga. 2013); Wilson v. County of Cook, 968 
N.E.2d 641, 654 (Ill. 2012); People v. Deroche, 829 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (per 
curiam); Pohlabel v. State, 268 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Nev. 2012); State v. Warmus, 967 N.E.2d 1223, 1236 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011); State v. Christian, 307 P.3d 429, 442–43 (Or. 2013). 
 63. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013) (no right to carry firearms in 
public without permit); United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 977–82 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(undocumented noncitizens not part of the “people” who enjoy the right to keep and bear arms); 
GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1261–66 (Second Amendment has not been historically understood to 
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As for the second prong, there is some diversity of opinion about the 
appropriate character of means-end scrutiny. The vast majority of 
appellate decisions to consider the question have rejected the claim that 
regulations limiting the ability to keep and bear arms in common civilian 
use are necessarily subject to strict scrutiny, in which a challenged 
regulation can be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.
64
 To be sure, Heller suggests that very 
serious burdens on core Second Amendment rights trigger strict scrutiny, 
if not per se invalidation. Lower courts have accommodated the point with 
essentially two approaches. Some have concluded all but the most serious 
burdens should be evaluated under a form of intermediate scrutiny, in 
which a challenged regulation is permissible when substantially related to 
an important governmental objective, and have applied this test in the vast 
majority of cases to uphold even laws that limit the ability to possess or 
carry firearms in common civilian use.
65
 Others have taken a more flexible 
 
 
confer a right to carry arms onto the property of another without the owner’s consent); United States v. 
Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 11–16 (1st Cir. 2009) (juveniles are not part of the “people” who enjoy the right 
to keep and bear arms); State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1005 (Wash. 2010) (juveniles are not part of the 
“people” who enjoy the right to keep and bear arms). 
 64. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–97 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195–98; United States 
v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 416–17 (4th Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256–58; United States v. 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 682–83; People v. Mitchell, 
148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33, 40–41 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 204–06 (Conn. 2014). 
But see Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 326–29 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 465–70 (4th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
prohibition on possessing firearms for those who are unlawful users or addicted to a controlled 
substance); Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961–70 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(upholding requirement that handguns be secured when not carried and a prohibition on the sale of 
hollow point bullets); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136–41 (upholding statute prohibiting possession of 
firearms by individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence); Drake, 724 F.3d at 435–40 
(upholding discretionary permit system to carry firearms requiring that applicant demonstrate 
particularized need); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–83 (same); Schrader, 704 F.3d at 989–91 (upholding 
prohibition on common-law misdemeanant possessing firearms); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 
F.3d 1164, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding prohibition on possession of firearms by 
undocumented noncitizens); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 226–31 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(upholding statute prohibiting possession of firearms by individuals under a domestic violence order of 
protection); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 158–67 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding statute 
prohibiting possession of firearms by individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence); 
Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257–59 (upholding ordinance prohibiting possession of semi-automatic rifles 
and large-capacity magazines); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding 
statute prohibiting possession of firearms by individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic 
violence); Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–04 (upholding statute prohibiting possession of firearms by 
individuals under a domestic violence order of protection); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95–99 (upholding 
statute prohibiting possession of firearms with obliterated serial number); United States v. Skoien, 614 
F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding statute prohibiting possession of firearms by 
individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence); People v. Ellison, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 245, 
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approach in which laws imposing more onerous burdens on the right to 
keep or bear firearms should be subject to concomitantly more demanding 
scrutiny, but these courts still frequently uphold such laws.
66
 In either case, 
analysis centers on the extent to which a challenged law burdens the core 
interest in armed defense, without any claim that this type of inquiry is 
rooted in original meaning. Accordingly, the second prong of this test 
contains two analytically distinct steps in which, first, the extent of the 
burden on the right of lawful, armed defense is assessed in order to 
determine, then, the extent to which the challenged regulation will be 
regarded as constitutionally suspect. 
Yet, before concluding that Second Amendment jurisprudence is 
premised on an analysis of the extent to which a challenged law burdens 
the individual right to armed defense described in Heller, it is worth 
 
 
249–50 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding statute prohibiting concealed carry); Mitchell, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
40–43 (same); Hertz, 751 S.E.2d at 93–95 (upholding statute requiring license to carry firearms in 
public and disqualifying limited classes including convicted felons); Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205, 
222–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding permitting requirement for carrying concealed firearms); 
People v. Garvin, 994 N.E.2d 1076, 1084–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (upholding prohibition on possession 
of firearms by convicted felons); People v. Spencer, 965 N.E.2d 1135, 1143–45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
(same); Chardin v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 989 N.E.2d 392, 402–03 (Mass. 2013) (same); Chief of 
Police of Worcester v. Holden, 26 N.E.3d 715, 726–28 (Mass. 2015) (upholding discretionary 
licensing standard for carrying firearms in public); People v. Hughes, 1 N.E.3d 298, 300–02 (N.Y. 
2013) (upholding licensing requirement); In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 757–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2013) (upholding requirement for permit issued on showing of justifiable need to carry 
handguns); Johnston v. State, 735 S.E.2d 859, 869–70 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding for evaluation 
of statute prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons); State v. Shover, 8 N.E.3d 358, 361–
65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (upholding prohibition on transporting accessible and loaded firearm in 
vehicle); Christian, 307 P.3d at 444 (upholding ordinance prohibiting carrying loaded firearms in 
public without permit); In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1025–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (upholding 
prohibition on possession of firearms by mentally ill); Commonwealth v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 687–
91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (upholding ordinance prohibiting carrying loaded firearms in public without 
permit); State v. Jorgenson, 312 P.3d 960, 966–68 (Wash. 2013) (en banc) (upholding prohibition on 
possessing firearms by persons charged with serious crimes); State v. Pocian, 814 N.W.2d 894, 897 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding statute prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons). 
 66. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 939–42 (7th Cir. 2012) (invalidating a statute that 
prohibited carrying readily operable firearms in public); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93–97 (upholding 
statute that prohibited carrying firearms absent a permit issued on a showing of special need); Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195–98 (upholding statute prohibiting the sale of handguns to persons under 
age 21); United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166–68 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding statute prohibiting 
the purchase of firearms in another state and their transport to state of residence); Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–11 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting preliminary injunction against ordinance 
prohibiting firing ranges within city); DeCiccio, 105 A.3d at 204–10 (invalidating prohibition on 
transportation of dirk knives and police batons as applied to individual transporting from a former to a 
new residence). Cf. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“But 
instead of trying to decide what ‘level’ of scrutiny applies, and how it works, inquiries that do not 
resolve any concrete dispute, we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were 
common at the time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation 
or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of 
self-defense.” (citations omitted)). 
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pausing to consider laws that prevent entire classes of individuals from 
possessing firearms under any circumstance, such as statutory prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Appellate courts have 
universally upheld such laws under Heller,
67
 a perhaps unsurprising result 
given the Heller dicta seemingly blessing such laws.
68
 The same result has 
been obtained for statutes barring the possession of firearms by convicted 
domestic violence misdemeanants or those subject to a domestic violence 
order of protection.
69
 At most, some courts have left open the possibility 
that such laws might be invalidated as applied to particular individuals 
presenting little risk of misusing firearms,
70
 although other courts have 
concluded that the facial validity of a statutory prohibition on the 
possession of firearms precludes an as-applied challenge.
71
 But, as Eugene 
Volokh has observed, “[f]elons may need arms for lawful self-defense just 
as much as the rest of us do.”72 Thus, if Heller prohibits all laws that 
impose very severe burdens on an individual right of armed self-defense, it 
is unclear why convicted felons, for example, can be entirely deprived of 
that right consistent with Heller’s account of the Second Amendment’s 
original meaning. 
It is remarkable that an opinion that focused so consciously on the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause, and which 
abjured any form of interest balancing, has resulted in litigation that pays 
so little attention to the original meaning of the operative clause, and 
which seems to utilize interest balancing with abandon. Indeed, one of the 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United 
States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 
112–13 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693–94 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 
768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 
352 (5th Cir. 2009); Epps v. State, 55 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Hertz, 751 S.E.2d at 
94–95; Spencer, 965 N.E.2d at 1144–45; Deroche, 829 N.W.2d at 895; State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 
789, 793–98 (Minn. 2013); Pohlabel, 268 P.3d at 1267; Pocian, 814 N.W.2d at 897. 
 68. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 69. See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1141–42; Chapman, 666 F.3d at 227–31; Staten, 666 F.3d at 
160–67; United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 2011); Booker, 644 F.3d at 25; 
Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–04; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
 70. See, e.g., Moore, 666 F.3d at 319; Barton, 633 F.3d at 172–74; Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–93; 
Johnston, 735 S.E.2d at 869–70; see also Alexander C. Barrett, Note, Taking Aim at Felony 
Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 192–98 (2013) (arguing that as-applied challenges should be 
permitted). 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2014); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1141–42; Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1116–18. 
 72. Volokh, supra note 56, at 1499. 
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few lower courts to reject the prevailing approach characterized the 
embrace of means-ends scrutiny in post-Heller jurisprudence as “near-
identical to the freestanding ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ that Justice Breyer 
proposed—and that the majority explicitly rejected—in Heller.”73  
Some commentators believe that interest balancing is inevitable in 
Second Amendment jurisprudence despite its seeming rejection in 
Heller.
74
 Moreover, Heller can be read narrowly on this point; when 
discussing interest balancing, the Court referred to Justice Breyer’s 
advocacy of “none of the traditionally expressed levels (strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), but rather a judge-empowering 
‘interest-balancing inquiry,’” and responded, “[w]e know of no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected 
to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”75 It may be that this 
passage is best read to reject interest balancing only when not performed 
as part of one of the previously recognized approaches to means-ends 
scrutiny.
76
 Still, that lower courts seem to have experienced something of a 
gravitational pull toward common-law methods of adjudication that lack 
any grounding in original meaning suggests either that Heller’s Second 
Amendment originalism is something of a dead end, or that lower courts 
have taken a wrong turn. It is to the latter possibility that we next turn. 
II. THE PROBLEMATIC EFFORTS TO RESCUE SECOND AMENDMENT 
ORIGINALISM 
Perhaps lower courts have erred in paying so little attention, in Heller’s 
wake, to the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative 
clause. Although Heller offered scant guidance as to the original meaning 
 
 
 73. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted 781 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2015). For a useful discussion of the extent to which Heller labored to embrace a 
categorical rather than a balancing methodology, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in 
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–21 (2009). For a more general 
attack on the Second Amendment jurisprudence emerging in the lower courts, see Alice Marie Beard, 
Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 
673, 680–91 (2014). 
 74. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1297–99 
(2011); Rostron, supra note 38, at 756–64; Winkler, supra note 38, at 1571–73. 
 75. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). 
 76. For this insight, I am indebted to my co-author in an essay assessing the constitutionality of 
leading gun-control proposals advanced in the wake of the shootings in Newtown, Connecticut. See 
Lawrence E. Rosenthal & Adam Winkler, The Scope of Regulatory Authority Under the Second 
Amendment, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING POLICY WITH EVIDENCE AND 
ANALYSIS 225, 229 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013) [hereinafter REDUCING GUN 
VIOLENCE].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
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of an “infringe[ment]” on the right to keep and bear arms, it did note that 
original meaning “may of course include an idiomatic meaning,” and that 
“the Second Amendment . . . was widely understood to codify a pre-
existing right, rather than to fashion a new one.”77 An inquiry into 
framing-era practices and understandings may shed light on the original 
meaning of both the right to bear arms and the scope of regulatory 
authority. 
A. Framing-Era Practice 
Framing-era practice may shed considerable light on the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment. For example, in his extrajudicial 
writing, Justice Scalia, though acknowledging that the Constitution 
contains much that is “abstract and general rather than specific and 
concrete,” has added, “The context suggests that the abstract and general 
terms, like the concrete and particular ones, are meant to nail down current 
rights, rather than aspire after future ones—that they are abstract and 
general references to extant rights and freedoms possessed under the then-
current regime.”78 This observation seems particularly pertinent in light of 
Heller’s conclusion that the Second Amendment codified a preexisting 
right.
79
 On this view, framing-era practice fleshes out the original 
understanding of the framing-era right codified in the Second 
Amendment.
80
 Chief Justice Roberts may have had something like this in 
mind at oral argument in Heller when, in response to the Solicitor 
General’s suggestion that the Court adopt a test for assessing the 
constitutionality of firearms regulation like those utilized in other areas of 
constitutional law, he observed: 
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are 
proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly 
tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder 
why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard. 
 
 
 77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77, 603. 
 78. Scalia, supra note 23, at 135.  
 79. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 80. For similar arguments supporting reliance on framing-era practice to ascertain original 
meaning, see, for example, Kay, supra note 21, at 253; Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and 
Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1654–55 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, 
Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 
(2007); Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194–99 (2010); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: 
The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172–74 (1996).  
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Isn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the 
amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were 
available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the 
marketplace and all that, and determine how these—how this 
restriction and the scope of this right looks in relation to those?
81
  
In terms of framing-era regulation, Heller tells us that there is little 
framing-era precedent for anything other than “gunpowder storage laws” 
and laws “restrict[ing] the firing of guns within the city limits to at least 
some degree.”82 These laws, of course, did not prohibit anyone from 
possessing or carrying firearms. On this view, the Heller dicta on 
permissible firearms regulation, as well as the lower-court decisions 
upholding a variety of laws without framing-era support, are simply 
wrong. Yet, there are a number of reasons to resist this conclusion. 
1. The Perils of Reliance on Framing-Era Practice 
There are considerable perils in relying on framing-era practice when 
evaluating contemporary regulation. Consider, for example, the framing-
era firearm. The most advanced type of bearable firearm in the framing era 
was the flintlock smoothbore musket, which was difficult to load, could 
produce at most three shots per minute, and was inaccurate except at close 
range.
83
 Firearms in common civilian use have since evolved to include 
weapons capable of a far greater accuracy, range, and rate of fire, and they 
are far more likely to discharge accidentally.
84
 Thus, what was regarded as 
sufficient regulation in the framing era might accordingly be regarded as 
insufficient today, considering the greater dangers posed by contemporary 
firearms. As one eminent historian explained: 
[B]ecause eighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as 
threatening or lethal as those available today, we . . . cannot expect 
the discussants of the late 1780s to have cast their comments about 
keeping and bearing arms in the same terms that we would. Theirs 
 
 
 81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290).  
 82. Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also acknowledged a 
Massachusetts law prohibiting the storage of loaded firearms in buildings, but explained that it was 
little more than a fire-safety measure and was entitled to little weight in light of its apparent 
uniqueness. Id. at 631–32. 
 83. See Michael S. Obermeier, Comment, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” Under the Second 
Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 684–87 (2012). 
 84. See, e.g., TOM DIAZ, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF GUNS IN AMERICA 98–105 
(1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
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was a rhetoric of public liberty, not public health; of the danger 
from standing armies, not that of casual strangers, embittered family 
members, violent youth gangs, freeway snipers, and careless 
weapons keepers. Guns were so difficult to fire in the eighteenth 
century that the very idea of being accidentally killed by one was 
itself hard to conceive. Indeed, anyone wanting either to murder his 
family or protect his home in the eighteenth century would have 
been better advised (and much more likely) to grab an axe or knife 
than to load, prime, and discharge a firearm.
85
 
Indeed, constitutional law has already recognized the perils of relying on 
framing-era practice in light of the increased lethality of firearms. In 
Tennessee v. Garner,
86
 for example, the Court invalidated a statute 
codifying the framing-era rule of the common law that deadly force could 
be used to stop a fleeing felon as violative of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure, concluding: “Because of 
sweeping change in the legal and technological context, reliance on the 
common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores 
the purposes of a historical inquiry.”87 The Court elaborated: 
[T]he common-law rule developed at a time when weapons were 
rudimentary. Deadly force could be inflicted almost solely in a 
hand-to-hand struggle during which, necessarily, the safety of the 
arresting officer was at risk. Handguns were not carried by police 
officers until the latter half of the last century. Only then did it 
become possible to use deadly force from a distance as a means of 
apprehension. As a practical matter, the use of deadly force under 
the standard articulation of the common-law rule has an altogether 
different meaning—and harsher consequences—now than in past 
centuries.
88
  
Accordingly, “though the common-law pedigree of Tennessee’s rule is 
pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context mean the 
rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied.”89  
Justice Scalia made a similar point when considering the permissibility 
of a stop-and-frisk in the absence of probable cause to arrest under the 
 
 
 85. Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 103, 110 (2000). 
 86. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 87. Id. at 13. 
 88. Id. at 14–15 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 89. Id. at 15. 
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Fourth Amendment. He opined that although a frisk in such circumstances 
was likely regarded as unlawful in the framing era, it may have become 
constitutionally reasonable once “concealed weapons capable of harming 
the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach have become 
common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under 
the original standard.”90 
Scholars frequently acknowledge that original meaning can be distorted 
when framing-era practice is consulted without reference to historical 
context.
91
 Even most originalists draw a distinction between original 
meaning and original expected applications, and regard only the former as 
binding.
92
 Justice Scalia, too, has acknowledged that constitutional 
interpretation should be based on “semantic intention” and not “the 
concrete expectations of lawgivers.”93 Thus, there is reason to doubt the 
utility of framing-era practice as a means of ascertaining the boundaries of 
contemporary regulatory authority. Even in terms of original meaning, 
there is reason to doubt that only those regulations that were common in 
the framing era should be regarded as constitutionally permissible, for 
even the framers may have regarded semantic meaning, and not framing-
era practice, as the proper measure of constitutionality.
94
 
2. The Breadth of Framing-Era Regulatory Authority 
Framing-era practice embraces authority to undertake prophylactic 
regulation. For example, consider that Heller described the Second 
 
 
 90. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For additional 
examples of Justice Scalia’s willingness to depart from framing-era practice in light of changed 
circumstances, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1199–203 (2012). 
 91. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 21, at 10–16, 75–81; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: 
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating 
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 
1804–10 (1997); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 569, 591–617 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 
1205–08; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169–71 (1993). 
 92. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 21, at 6–14; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a 
Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2009); 
Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 
580–82 (2006); McConnell, supra note 21, at 1284–87; Paulsen, supra note 21, at 2059–62; Rotunda, 
supra note 21, at 513–14; James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New 
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1539–46 (2011); Solum, supra note 46, at 935. 
 93. Scalia, supra note 23, at 144. 
 94. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Some have made the 
argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are 
protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
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Amendment as “codif[ying] a right ‘inherited from our English 
ancestors,’”95 traceable to the English Bill of Rights.96 The English Bill of 
Rights, in turn, provided that “the Subjects which are Protestants may have 
Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by 
law.”97 Note that this right was highly qualified. The limitation of the right 
to Protestants, and for the entire populace, protecting only arms “suitable 
to their condition,” likely reflects the widespread suspicion of Catholics as 
well as the lower classes.
98
 Moreover, the right was framed to preserve a 
power to regulate by statute, indicating, as Heller explained, that the right 
“was held only against the Crown, not Parliament.”99 By the framing era, 
English law had evolved to remove the religious qualification but 
continued to recognize a legislative power to regulate; as Blackstone put 
it, English law protected the people’s right “of having arms for their 
defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by 
law. Which . . . is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions 
. . . .”100 Thus, the preexisting English iteration of the right to keep and 
bear arms twinned both right and regulatory authority. 
To be sure, as Don Kates has argued, the Second Amendment is a 
constitutional limitation, and, accordingly, reliance on the regulatory 
power preserved in the English Bill of Rights might be thought to “miss[] 
the distinction between the American system of constitutional rights and 
the non-constitutional English system in which even the most sacrosanct 
rights guaranteed by one Parliament may be abrogated by its 
successors.”101 Nevertheless, to the extent that the Second Amendment is 
thought to have codified a preexisting right derived from English law, the 
limited character of that right surely is of some importance in ascertaining 
 
 
 95. Id. at 599 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).  
 96. Id. at 592–93, 599. For similar characterizations, see, for example, HALBROOK, supra note 
33, at 20–21, 43–46; JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 162–64 (1994); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning 
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 235–39 (1983); Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. 
Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in 
the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 834–41 (1997). 
 97. Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1688, 1 W&M Sess. 2, c. 2. 
 98. See, e.g., Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 27, 43–47 (2000). 
 99. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. For a helpful discussion of the point, see Schwoerer, supra note 98, 
at 47–48. 
 100. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (1765) (modern 
spelling added). In Heller, the Court described Blackstone as “the preeminent authority on English law 
for the founding generation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 
(1999)). 
 101. Kates, supra note 96, at 237–38. 
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the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, American 
experience with firearms regulation reflects recognition of evolving 
regulatory power consistent with the character of the preexisting English 
right. 
Although, as Heller noted, framing-era regulation was limited, it was 
not insignificant. Classes of individuals such as slaves, freed blacks, and 
people of mixed race were frequently prohibited from owning or carrying 
guns, and some states extended this bar to Catholics or whites unwilling to 
swear allegiance to the Revolution.
102
 Indeed, it was widely believed that 
only loyalists possessed a right to bear arms, with others facing sanctions 
including disarmament.
103
 Laws even regulated the manner of owning 
firearms; such as regulations requiring the safe storage of firearms or 
gunpowder or barring loaded firearms indoors.
104
 Militia laws also 
frequently required individuals to appear at periodic musters with their 
firearms and have them registered and inspected.
105
  
Subsequently, in the 1820s and ‘30s, laws prohibiting the carrying of 
concealed firearms emerged following a surge in violent crime.
106
 
Although laws prohibiting open-carry were more often than not 
invalidated, concealed-carry bans were generally upheld against 
constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment or state-law 
analogues,
107
 as Heller acknowledged.
108
  
 
 
 102. See, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 113–17 (2011); Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to 
Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 
139, 159–65 (2007); Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American 
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 506–12 (2004).  
 103. See Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia” 
Asserted and Proven with Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NE. U. 
L.J. 1, 59–61, 97–98 (2011).  
 104.  See WINKLER, supra note 102, at 116–17; Cornell & DeDino, supra note 102, at 510–12; 
Churchill, supra note 102, at 163–64. 
 105. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 3, 27 (2006); WINKLER, supra note 102, at 113–14; Churchill, 
supra note 102, at 161. 
 106. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 105, at 138–44; CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON 
LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: DUELING, SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 2–3, 139–41 
(1999); WINKLER, supra note 102, at 166–69; Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right To Bear 
Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1599–601 (2014). 
 107. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 106, at 4; ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 51–52 (2001); Cornell & DeDino, supra note 102, at 516–
17; David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second 
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 615–17 (1986); Kopel, supra note 33, at 1416–33; 
Leider, supra note 106, at 1606–19; Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to 
Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. 
REV. 585, 640 (2012); Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-
Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1510–16 (2014); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
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Later, the same Congress that framed the Fourteenth Amendment—
which rendered the Second Amendment applicable to state and local 
laws
109—enacted legislation abolishing the militia in most southern states 
and prohibiting any effort to arm militias in those states.
110
 The measure’s 
sponsors dismissed Second Amendment objections, arguing that the 
prohibition was justified by the prevalence of armed groups in the South, 
in the wake of the Civil War, “dangerous to the public peace and to the 
security of Union citizens in those States.”111 This legislation was one in a 
series of gun-control measures undertaken at the time in an effort to 
suppress what was seen as unacceptable levels of violence, principally in 
the South.
112
 Also in the nineteenth century, in response to rampant 
violence, some frontier towns limited or even banned the carrying of 
firearms, an approach taken in many cities as well.
113
 
Regulation continued apace in the twentieth century. Early in the 
century, a number of state and local governments enacted new restrictions 
on the sale and carrying of firearms.
114
 For example, prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by convicted felons emerged early in the twentieth 
century in response to a crime wave following the First World War.
115
 At 
the federal level, the National Firearms Act of 1934 required 
manufacturers to obtain a federal license and register machine guns, short-
barrel rifles, silencers, and other weapons regarded as dangerous.
116
 The 
Firearms Act of 1938 required a license to ship firearms in interstate 
commerce and prohibited transfers to specified classes of individuals 
including certain convicted felons, fugitives from justice, and persons 
 
 
165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (dictum) (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not 
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”). 
 108. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612–14, 626 (2008). 
 109. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 110. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 6, 14 Stat. 485, 487.  
 111. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1849 (1867) (Sen. Lane); accord id. at 1848–49 (Sen. 
Wilson). 
 112. See Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun 
Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 620–23 (2006); Leider, supra 
note 106, at 1619–23. 
 113. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 114–18 (2013). For a 
compilation of firearms laws enacted before 1900, see Mark Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons 
Legislation up to the Early Twentieth Century (Working Paper, 2013), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200991. 
 114. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 107, at 105–11 
 115. See, e.g., C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 695, 698–728 (2009).  
 116. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 107, at 141–44; WINKLER, supra note 102, at 202–04; 
Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 
138–39 (1975). 
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under indictment.
117
 The Gun Control Act of 1968 later prohibited the 
interstate shipment of firearms except to a licensed dealer or collector, 
required all dealers to obtain federal licenses, placed limitations on the 
importation of firearms, and prohibited the sale of firearms to, and their 
possession by, additional classes of disqualified individuals, including 
convicted felons, those suffering from serious mental illness, substance 
abusers, and minors.
118
 In 1993, Congress required a background check to 
purchase handguns, and, the following year, it banned the possession of 
specified assault weapons for the ensuing decade.
119
 
In Heller, in order to ascertain the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment, the Court examined commentary and practice from “after its 
ratification through the end of the 19th century.”120 It did so to undertake 
“the examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the 
public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or 
ratification,” adding that “[t]hat sort of inquiry is a critical tool of 
constitutional interpretation.”121 There is indeed a convincing case for 
utilizing post-enactment practice as evidence of original meaning.
122
 Yet, 
this methodology suggests that the Second Amendment did not fix 
regulatory authority in terms of only those regulations prevalent at the 
Second Amendment’s ratification, but instead was capable of changing to 
meet felt exigencies. The recognition that regulatory infrastructure does 
not seem to have been fixed at the framing does not offer a very precise 
methodology for ascertaining the scope of regulatory power. But it does 
suggest that, even in terms of original meaning, framing-era regulatory 
practice is of limited interpretive significance. 
B. Historical Analogy 
Before abandoning framing-era practice as a means to flesh out the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment, it is worth considering 
whether framing-era practice, even if not dispositive, can nevertheless 
provide useful insights to guide constitutional interpretation. Perhaps the 
leading scholarly advocate of this approach to originalism is Lawrence 
 
 
 117. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 107, at 146–47; Zimring, supra note 116, at 139–41. 
 118. See, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 102, at 251–52; Zimring, supra note 116, at 148–57. 
 119. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 107, at 249–56; ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN 
CONTROL 141–53 (5th ed. 2012). 
 120. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008). 
 121. Id. 
 122. For a powerful argument in support of this view, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and 
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–39 (2003). 
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Lessig, who contends that the presuppositions underlying framing-era 
practices and understandings should be identified and then “translated” in 
light of contemporary understandings and circumstances.
123
 Darrell Miller 
has made a similar suggestion for the Second Amendment, arguing that 
Second Amendment jurisprudence could be modeled on that of the 
Seventh Amendment, which evaluates contemporary civil-jury practice 
through analogical reasoning based on framing-era practice.
124
 
1. Historical Analogy’s Questionable Originalist Pedigree 
At the outset, it is questionable whether Professor Miller’s approach is 
premised on the original meaning of the Second Amendment. The Seventh 
Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law . . . the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of 
the common law.”125 This formulation expressly embraces extant 
common-law jury practice, and thus it should come as no surprise that the 
Supreme Court has looked to framing-era jury practice when interpreting 
the Seventh Amendment.
126
 The Second Amendment, however, employs a 
different textual formulation; it forbids “infringe[ment]” of the right to 
keep and bear arms rather than “preserv[ing]” that right.  
 
 
 123. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 395, 401–14 (1995); Lessig, supra note 91, at 1174–1211. 
 124. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can 
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 893–907 (2013); see also Heller v. District of 
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen 
legislatures seek to address new weapons that have not traditionally existed or to impose new gun 
regulations because of conditions that have not traditionally existed, there obviously will not be a 
history or tradition of banning such weapons or imposing such regulations. . . . [I]n such cases, the 
proper interpretive approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition.”). For a proposal along 
similar lines, advocating the use of analogical reasoning based on “historical guideposts,” see Patrick 
J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” and 
the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 13–16 
(2010). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 126. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999); 
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–52 (1998); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533–34 (1970). This is 
not, however, the only plausible understanding of the original meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 89–93 (1998) 
(Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury in federal court only when a jury is available in state court); 
Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 407, 479–83 (1999) (Seventh Amendment leaves federal jury rights to congressional 
discretion); Rachael E. Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative 
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 616–29 (1996) (same). 
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Professor Miller nevertheless argues that whenever there is a failure to 
“preserve” the right to keep and bear arms there is necessarily an 
infringement, suggesting parallelism between the Second and Seventh 
Amendments.
127
 This reading of the Second Amendment, however, treats 
different textual formulations as if they were identical. It also fails to 
explain how the Amendment could tolerate any limitations on the right to 
“keep or bear,” that is, to possess or carry firearms, if the text is properly 
understood to prohibit any infringement on an individual right to possess 
and carry anything that qualifies as bearable “Arms.” Professor Miller 
acknowledges the problem, writing that the Second Amendment could not 
possibly “mean what it says,” but must tolerate limitations on the right to 
keep and bear arms by virtue of an “idiomatic meaning.”128 If the term 
“infringe[d]” in the Second Amendment had this type of an idiomatic 
meaning in the framing era, however, Professor Miller does not identify 
any historical evidence that it was understood as a synonym for the term 
“preserve” in the Seventh Amendment.  
2. The Difficulties of Historical Analogy 
Even if the Second Amendment’s meaning is properly discoverable 
through analogy to framing-era practice, the process of applying framing-
era practice and understandings to contemporary circumstances presents 
considerable difficulty, as the critics of Professor Lessig’s methodology 
have contended.
129
 In the context of the civil jury right, reasoning by 
historical analogy has often proven difficult; it requires a challenging 
counterfactual inquiry into whether a civil action unknown in the framing 
era would have been tried to a jury at the framing, as Professor Miller 
admits.
130
 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that drawing analogies to 
framing-era practice does not always supply an adequate basis for 
assessing whether an action, unknown in the framing era, must be tried to 
a jury, and it has for that reason concluded the Seventh Amendment 
inquiry turns primarily on whether the remedy sought in a new form of 
 
 
 127. See Miller, supra note 124, at 897–99. 
 128. Id. at 896, 898 (footnotes omitted). 
 129. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the 
Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 370–75 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A 
Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1436–38 (1997); 
Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1998); 
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 394–412 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 941–44 (2003).  
 130. See Miller, supra note 124, at 884–86. 
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action resembles a damages remedy at common law.
131
 A focus on remedy 
alone surely simplifies matters, but no comparable metric presents itself 
for assessing firearms regulation, which involves no single remedy for a 
legal wrong but rather a complex balance between liberty and the need for 
prophylactic regulation of weapons posing far greater dangers than were 
known in the framing era.  
As Joseph Blocher has observed, analogical reasoning involves marked 
difficulty when it comes to the Second Amendment, since there is no 
agreement on a methodology for determining which similarities between 
contemporary and framing-era regulations should be regarded as 
relevant.
132
 Beyond that, when the relevant historical context has 
sufficiently changed, it is doubtful that efforts to analogize to framing-era 
practice have utility.
133
 For example, when a contemporary regulation has 
no fair framing-era analog, that may not be indication of its invalidity but, 
rather, merely a reflection of changed circumstances. Although there may 
have been relatively little gun control in the framing era, firearms were 
also far less lethal; accordingly, framing-era judgments about the need for 
regulation were made in a context far different from contemporary 
circumstances. The absence of an analogous framing-era regulation to a 
challenged contemporary law may therefore indicate no more than the fact 
that no fairly analogous regulatory issue arose in the framing era.  
Even when analogous framing-era regulations can be identified, many 
difficulties remain. The prophylactic regulations of the framing era utilized 
proxies for dangerousness that we would today find wildly inaccurate, if 
not profoundly offensive, such as religion, race, and political loyalty. Yet, 
if contemporary regulation based on similarly unreliable proxies were 
permitted, virtually any regulation might be sustained. For example, such 
rough proxies for special dangerousness would seemingly provide 
sufficient support for the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, since, as 
Justice Breyer observed in Heller, there was plenty of evidence that 
handguns were strongly linked to crime, injuries, and death.
134
 
 
 
 131. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570–74 
(1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–25 (1987).  
 132. See Joseph Blocher, Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns, 
91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 37, 41–43 (2012); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) 
(“[A]n analogue test would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which 
digital files are comparable to physical records. Is an e-mail equivalent to a letter? Is a voicemail 
equivalent to a phone message slip? It is not clear how officers could make these kinds of decisions 
before conducting a search, or how courts would apply the proposed rule after the fact.”). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 83–94. 
 134. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693–99 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia has himself rejected analogical reasoning as an 
originalist methodology. In United States v. Jones,
135
 he authored the 
opinion of the Court that invoked framing-era conceptions of trespass to 
support its holding that the attachment and monitoring of a global 
positioning device to an automobile in order to determine its location was 
a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.136 In his separate 
opinion, however, Justice Alito observed that “it is almost impossible to 
think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place 
in this case,” such as “a case in which a constable secreted himself 
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to 
monitor the movements of the owner,” adding that, even then, “this would 
have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”137 
Justice Scalia responded: “[I]t is quite irrelevant whether there was an 
18th-century analog. . . . [O]ur task, at a minimum, is to decide whether 
the action in question would have constituted a ‘search’ within the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”138 This view plainly rejects the 
necessity to identify a framing-era analog in order to apply the original 
meaning of a constitutional provision. 
Some concrete examples illustrate the manifold problems with the use 
of historical analogy. Consider, for example, laws prohibiting the 
possession of high-capacity magazines thought by some to facilitate mass 
shootings by enabling offenders to fire many rounds at a high rate.
139
 
Framing-era firearms were capable of nothing approximating this rate of 
fire. Thus, it is doubtful that the framing-era faced any fairly analogous 
regulatory issue. 
Or, consider the surprisingly knotty problem of analogical reasoning 
presented by laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by convicted 
felons. Some commentators have argued that because laws prohibiting the 
possession of firearms by convicted felons appeared only in the twentieth 
century, they have questionable originalist support.
140
 Don Kates 
responded with an analogy: most felonies in the framing era were 
 
 
 135. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 136. Id. at 949–52. 
 137. Id. at 958 & n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 138. Id. at 950 n.3. 
 139. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Pro-Gun Voices in Congress Are Open to Bullet Capacity 
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1. 
 140. See Larson, supra note 38, at 1376; Lund, supra note 27, at 1356–58; Marshall, supra note 
115, at 707–12. In the framing era, it appears that the only laws prohibiting the possession of firearms 
on the basis of criminal misconduct were laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by prisoners. See 
Leider, supra note 106, at 1599. 
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punished by death and forfeiture of property, and therefore a framing-era 
felony conviction effectively extinguished the right to keep and bear arms 
like contemporary laws barring felons from possessing firearms.
141
 But 
Kevin Marshall observed that the imposition of capital punishment and 
forfeiture upon a felony conviction was far from universal in the framing 
era.
142
 Thus, it seems that a felony conviction was not universally 
associated with a loss of firearms rights. Even so, Kates and others have 
responded, framing-era rhetoric often associated the right to bear arms 
with the full membership in the polity afforded to law-abiding citizens, 
which could presumably be forfeited as a consequence of criminal 
misconduct.
143
 Still, the advocates of this view have not identified 
framing-era precedents to support their speculation. Moreover, Marshall 
and others have added, although there were some framing-era proposals 
that would have carved out from the right to bear arms those who had 
committed crimes or were otherwise dangerous or untrustworthy, the text 
of the Second Amendment was not framed in those terms.
144
 Beyond that, 
it seems indisputable that a felony conviction has far different significance 
today than in the framing era. As the Court has explained: 
Almost all crimes formerly punishable by death no longer are or can 
be. And while in earlier times “the gulf between the felonies and the 
minor offences was broad and deep,” today the distinction is minor 
and often arbitrary. Many crimes classified as misdemeanors, or 
nonexistent, at common law are now felonies.
145
  
Thus, it is doubtful that a framing-era felony conviction is properly 
analogized to a contemporary felony conviction. 
 
 
 141. See Kates, supra note 96, at 266.  
 142. See Marshall, supra note 115, at 714–16. For helpful explications of the limited use of capital 
punishment for felony convictions in the framing era, see, for example, STUART BANNER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 53–70, 94–100 (2002), and Jeffrey K. Sawyer, “Benefit of Clergy” 
in Maryland and Virginia, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 57–67 (1990). Indeed, “[f]or 1791, the most 
comprehensive database available records only eleven executions in the United States: seven for 
murder, two for forgery, and one each for rape and for burglary.” Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the 
Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1085, 1098 (2012). 
 143. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1359–62 (2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A 
Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 480–81 (1995). 
 144. See Larson, supra note 38, at 1374–76; Marshall, supra note 115, at 712–13; Rostron, supra 
note 38, at 731–32. 
 145. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (citations omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1218 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1187 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is small wonder that courts considering the historical 
evidence on felon disqualification often find it inconclusive.
146 
Perhaps 
only those convicted of felonies regarded as dangerous should be barred 
from possessing firearms, as some commentators have argued.
147
 This 
approach, however, would enmesh courts in the difficult predictive 
business of judging which felonies present unacceptable risk of future 
firearms-related misconduct, a type of judgment alien to the framing-era 
regime.
148
 Even worse, many framing-era felonies did not require proof of 
violence.
149
 This proposal might also warrant treating certain violent 
misdemeanors or other potential indicia of dangerousness as the basis for 
depriving individuals of their right to keep and bear arms. Whether this 
new constitutional inquiry has any fair analogy in framing-era practice, 
however, is highly uncertain.  
Finally, consider laws that restrict carrying firearms in public places, 
whether concealed or openly. Laws prohibiting carrying concealed 
weapons became common in the nineteenth century.
150
 Significantly, as 
Heller acknowledged, most nineteenth-century courts upheld bans on 
carrying firearms in public places against challenges under the Second 
Amendment or its state constitutional analogues.
151
 Some commentators 
locate originalist support for laws limiting the right to carry firearms in the 
Statute of Northampton,
152
 which they believe was understood as a broad 
prohibition on carrying firearms because of their potential to alarm 
others.
153
 Blackstone’s description of the statute seems to characterize it in 
these terms: “[R]iding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual 
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people 
 
 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–81 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 147. See, e.g., Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by 
Nonviolent Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 127–32 (2013); Kates & Cramer, supra note 143, at 1362–
64; Marshall, supra note 115, at 728–35. 
 148. Cf. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007) (determining what constitutes a 
“violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act “requires judges to make sometimes 
difficult evaluations of the risks posed by different offenses”). 
 149. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 128 (falsifying records), 143–44 (unlawful 
hunting), 155 (smuggling), 156 (bankruptcy fraud), 163–64 (bigamy), 224 (burglary), 229–34 
(larceny). 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 151. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 152. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3, § 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 153. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History 
Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7–30 (2012); Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1317–18 
(2009).  
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of the land.”154 Hawkins provided a potentially narrower description, 
however, requiring that the firearm be carried in circumstances likely to 
provoke alarm: “[N]o Wearing of Arms is within the Meaning of this 
Statute, unless it be accompanied with such Circumstances as are apt to 
terrify the People.”155 Coke, in contrast, described the statute in broad 
terms, providing that all but royal officials, those assisting them, and those 
responding to “a Cry made for armies to keep the peace,” are forbidden “to 
go nor ride armed by night nor by day.”156 
If the Second Amendment codified a preexisting right of English 
origin, perhaps it incorporated the limitation on that right represented by 
the Statute of Northampton, although the English sources describe the 
statute somewhat inconsistently. There is also, however, a line of 
nineteenth-century American precedent that seemingly recognized a right 
to carry firearms in public, at least openly,
157
 and some commentators 
believe that the prevailing understanding was that the carrying of weapons 
could be prohibited only when it was done in a manner that could alarm 
others, as when they were concealed.
158
 Still, the historical evidence is in 
conflict; there is some historical precedent for prohibitions on carrying 
firearms in public, whether openly or concealed.
159
 Moreover, as Saul 
Cornell has noted, virtually all the nineteenth-century laws and judicial 
decisions drawing a distinction between concealed and open carry or 
embracing a right to carry firearms in public were in the South, where the 
need to carry arms may have been regarded as greater given the prevalence 
of slavery, while in the North broader prohibitions on carrying arms in 
public seem to have been generally regarded as within the scope of the 
 
 
 154. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 1489 (emphasis omitted). 
 155. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136 (3d ed. 1739) (modern 
spelling added). 
 156. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1644) 
(modern spelling added). 
 157. See, e.g., John C. Frazer, Home, Sweet Home? The Second Amendment and the Right to 
Carry Firearms in Public, 4 REGENT J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7–16 (2012); Kopel, supra note 33, at 
1416–33; O’Shea, supra note 107, at 623–42.  
 158. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 96, at 104–05; David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State 
Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 
1126–27 (2010); Marshall, supra note 115, at 716–19; Eugene Volokh, The First and Second 
Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101–02 (2009); see also Blocher, supra note 113, at 
112–14 (discussing the debate over the scope of regulatory authority). 
 159. See Charles, supra note 153, at 31–41; Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of 
the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1707–
24 (2012). For judicial opinions endorsing the constitutionality of bans on open carry, see, for 
example, Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461–62 (1876); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 473, 473–75 (1874); Andrews 
v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178–82 (1871); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478–79 (1871). 
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police power.
160
 Thus, the probative value of the historical evidence 
suggesting a right to carry firearms in public, at least openly, is quite 
unclear. 
If one is willing to rely on the historical evidence from the antebellum 
South, despite its suspect provenance, perhaps there is a case for drawing a 
distinction between concealed and open carry on the ground. One could 
argued that laws prohibiting concealed carry are fairly analogous to the 
Statute of Northampton because of the potential for concealed weapons to 
alarm others, while open carry was not regarded as alarming. This 
explanation for the historical evidence, however, is, at best, incomplete. A 
concealed weapon, precisely because it is hidden from view, cannot alarm 
others unaware of its presence. Instead, as Professor Volokh has noted, 
those jurisdictions that drew a distinction between concealed carry and 
open carry seem to have proceeded on the view that law-abiding persons 
carried weapons openly, while concealed carry was thought suspicious or 
threatening.
161
 There is ample expression in nineteenth-century decisions 
to this effect.
162
 On this view, however, concealed carry is used as a proxy 
for dangerousness, a rather different type of regulation than is reflected in 
the Statute of Northampton, at least in its narrower formulations. Beyond 
that, Professor Volokh rightly questions the view that the Statute of 
Northampton can fairly justify prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms 
 
 
 160. See Cornell, supra note 159, at 1716–25. 
 161. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1522–23. For an analysis along similar lines, see Leider, supra 
note 106, at 1604–05; and Meltzer, supra note 107, at 1518–20. 
 162. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 617 (1840) (“[A] law which is intended merely to 
promote personal security, and to put down lawless aggression and violence, and to that end inhibits 
the wearing of certain weapons, in such a manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon 
the moral feelings of the wearer, by making him less regardful of the personal security of others, does 
not come in collision with the constitution.”); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846) (same); State v. 
Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 633 (1856) (“Th[e Second Amendment] was never intended to prevent the 
individual States from adopting such measures of police as might be necessary, in order to protect the 
orderly and well disposed citizens from the treacherous use of weapons not even designed for any 
purpose of public defence, and used most frequently by evil-disposed men who seek an advantage over 
their antagonists, in the disturbances and breaches of the peace which they are prone to provoke.”); 
State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (“This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if 
necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly 
assassinations.”); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 160 (1840) (“[T]he right to bear arms is 
not of that unqualified character. . . . [T]hey may be borne by an individual, merely to terrify the 
people or for purposes of private assassination. And, as the manner in which they are worn and 
circumstances under which they are carried indicate to every man the purpose of the wearer, the 
Legislature may prohibit such manner of wearing as would never be resorted to by persons engaged in 
the common defence.”). 
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under contemporary circumstances, in which many might find open carry 
far more alarming than a discreetly concealed firearm.
163
  
Thus, whether framing-era practice provides fair analogical support for 
analyzing the contemporary scope of the right to carry weapons in public, 
whether openly or concealed, is quite unclear. It seems likely that the 
nineteenth-century approach of forbidding concealed but not open carry—
even if that is regarded as the prevailing view of the day despite the 
evidence of a different approach in the north—is best understood as 
utilizing concealment as a proxy for identifying individuals likely to be 
carrying weapons for an improper purpose. We can fairly doubt, however, 
whether this proxy is fairly rooted in the Statute of Northampton, and 
whether it has fair application in contemporary conditions.  
Of course, one could reject the historical basis for distinguishing 
between concealed carry and open carry. A divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit did just that by holding that the Second Amendment permits a 
prohibition on either concealed or open carry, but not both, and for that 
reason invalidating a restrictive permitting policy for carrying concealed 
firearms in light of a concurrent statutory ban on open carry.
164
 Again, 
however, it is debatable whether this approach represents a fair analogy to 
framing-era practice, which recognized regulatory power to restrict the 
carrying of firearms under what were regarded as suspicious or alarming 
circumstances. The Ninth Circuit panel, in contrast, appeared indifferent to 
whether either concealed or open carry is properly regarded as potentially 
dangerous or alarming. In any event, although the panel purported to 
ground its invalidation in a limitation on the ability to carry concealed 
firearms in the original understanding of the Second Amendment,
165
 it is 
hard to miss the ahistorical character of this holding. As the dissenting 
judge noted, there is ample historical evidence indicating that prohibitions 
on concealed carry have long been regarded as consistent with the Second 
Amendment, yet the majority invalidated a law restricting concealed and 
not open carry.
166
 A Second Amendment jurisprudence that is indifferent 
to whether concealed or open carry represents a threat to the public 
safety—instead leaving the legislature entirely free to decide which to 
ban—seems to offer little in the way of fair analogy to the framing-era 
 
 
 163. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1521–23. 
 164. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167–73 (9th Cir. 2014) ), reh’g granted 
781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205, 225–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (upholding a permit requirement for concealed carry in a state that bans open carry but stressing 
that permits are liberally available). 
 165. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1153–67. 
 166. Id. at 1181–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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understanding, which permitted regulation under circumstances regarded 
as suspicious or alarming. The Ninth Circuit’s decision, rather than 
reflecting an authentic Second Amendment originalism, more likely 
demonstrates the limitations of that approach.
167
 
Professor Miller has acknowledged that adjudication by historical 
analogy is, at best, “a partial solution,”168 and admits that it supplies no 
clear answer even for the two regulatory issues he discusses in his own 
article: whether the Second Amendment permits prohibitions on carrying 
firearms in public and large-capacity magazines.
169
 A methodology this 
imprecise hardly seems a satisfactory basis for constitutional adjudication. 
Indeed, plausible analogical arguments frequently can be deployed to 
attack or defend challenged regulations, yet no methodology presents 
itself, originalist or otherwise, for selecting the appropriate analogy. Like 
all counterfactual historical inquiries, an effort to determine how the 
framers would have assessed regulatory issues alien to their world is 
fraught with peril. Second Amendment originalism will need something 
more than analogical reasoning to produce a workable jurisprudence. 
C. Longstanding Regulations 
Another effort to develop an authentically originalist approach in 
contrast to that taken by lower courts in Heller’s wake would insist that a 
regulation have a substantial historical pedigree, even if lacking in framing 
era support.
170
 This approach finds support in Heller’s dicta declining “to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions.”171 Along these lines, Professor 
Blocher has argued that the Second Amendment should be understood to 
permit some local variability in the scope of firearms regulation in light of 
 
 
 167. Conversely, one could take the view that Second Amendment jurisprudence should continue 
to ape the distinction drawn in the nineteenth century between concealed and open carry regardless of 
its likely inapplicability to contemporary circumstances, as did one student commentator. See Meltzer, 
supra note 107, at 1520. But, as we have seen, the Second Amendment has never been understood to 
freeze regulatory authority in place. And beyond that, an originalism that pays no attention to the 
historical context in which legal rules developed is deeply problematic: if the rationale on which the 
nineteenth-century law distinguished between concealed and open carry has no continuing vitality, 
perhaps even those who crafted the distinction would regard it as inapplicable to the contemporary 
context. Given that the Second Amendment does not codify framing-era practice and has long been 
understood to permit regulatory evolution, there is little justification for wooden adherence to past 
practice, as we have seen in Part II.A above.  
 168. Miller, supra note 124, at 917.  
 169. See id. at 919–21, 926–29. 
 170. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431–34 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. White, 593 
F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 171. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). See also Blocher, supra note 113, 
at 108–11 (discussing this approach). 
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the longstanding record of relatively more intensive firearms regulation in 
cities when compared to rural areas.
172
 
It is difficult, however, to reconcile this approach with Heller’s 
originalism. Nothing in the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause, as explicated in Heller, explains why longstanding 
regulations, especially when they lack a framing-era pedigree, deserve 
deference. Indeed, Heller tells us that the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause conferred an individual right to possess or 
carry any firearms in common civilian use, with no exception for 
“longstanding” infringements on this right. To be sure, that a particular 
regulation managed to avoid invalidation for some substantial time might 
be some evidence that it is consistent with original meaning. There are 
also sound arguments for deference to longstanding practice, 
understandings, and traditions.
173
 Nevertheless, treating regulations that 
lack a substantial historical pedigree as invalid for that reason alone is 
deeply problematic. Not only does this view have no footing in Heller’s 
account of the original meaning the operative clause, but it regards all 
novel regulations as invalid unless and until they somehow survive some 
type of incubation period. Yet, every regulation now regarded as 
longstanding went through such an incubation period. As Judge 
Easterbrook put it when discussing the constitutionality of section 
922(g)(9) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which prohibits the 
possession of firearms by anyone “who has been convicted in any court of 
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”174: 
The first federal statute disqualifying felons from possessing 
firearms was not enacted until 1938; it also disqualified 
misdemeanants who had been convicted of violent offenses. A 1938 
law may be “longstanding” from the perspective of 2008, when 
Heller was decided, but 1938 is 147 years after the states ratified the 
Second Amendment. The Federal Firearms Act covered only a few 
violent offenses; the ban on possession by all felons was not 
enacted until 1961. In 1968 Congress changed the “receipt” element 
of the 1938 law to “possession,” giving 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) its 
current form. If such a recent extension of the disqualification to 
non-violent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is 
presumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26, it is difficult 
 
 
 172. See Blocher, supra note 113, at 108–21. 
 173. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 269–71. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
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to condemn § 922(g)(9), which like the 1938 Act is limited to 
violent crimes. It would be weird to say that § 922(g)(9) is 
unconstitutional in 2010 but will become constitutional by 2043, 
when it will be as “longstanding” as § 922(g)(1) was when the 
Court decided Heller.
175
 
Indeed, as the discussion in Part II.A above makes plain, the Second 
Amendment seems to have long been understood to permit novel 
regulations, despite the fact that those regulations were not “longstanding” 
for some period of time after they first appeared. A methodology that 
regards regulations as unconstitutional only during the period before they 
become “longstanding” is rooted in neither originalism nor any coherent 
program of constitutional interpretation. 
D. Doctrinal Borrowing 
A final possibility for developing an originalist Second Amendment 
jurisprudence would be to borrow doctrine from parallel constitutional 
text. If the Second Amendment bears textual similarities to other 
constitutional provisions, one plausible approach would be to interpret the 
Second Amendment in a similar fashion to those parallel provisions.
176
 For 
example, Part II.B considered the proposal to utilize the analogical 
approach of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence to assess the propriety of 
contemporary firearms legislation. Yet, as that example demonstrates, 
there are formidable textual and practical obstacles to utilizing analogical 
reasoning in the Second Amendment context.  
Another approach to doctrinal borrowing invokes the jurisprudence 
developed under the First Amendment’s prohibition on laws “abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.”177 Heller invoked the First 
Amendment at several points in the opinion as an example of an analogous 
individual right.
178
 Since the First Amendment confers an individual right 
 
 
 175. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640–41 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
 176. For a useful discussion of this approach, see Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional 
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010). 
 177. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 178. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Just as the First Amendment 
protects modern forms of communications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of 
search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, 
even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” (citations omitted)); id. at 592 (“[I]t 
has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to 
protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First 
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”); id. at 635 (“The First 
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in a seemingly unambiguous fashion, but has been interpreted to permit 
some forms of regulation under various formulations, perhaps Second 
Amendment jurisprudence should be constructed in a parallel fashion.
179
  
Some commentators have argued that First Amendment doctrine 
should be used as a model for Second Amendment jurisprudence.
180
 Some 
courts have embraced that view.
181
 Others have been more skeptical.
182
  
At the outset, there is little reason to believe that a Second Amendment 
jurisprudence constructed to mirror free-speech doctrine would qualify as 
originalist. The original meaning of the First Amendment is itself unclear; 
there is something verging on consensus among scholars that no coherent 
account emerges from the historical evidence, and certainly no account 
that explains contemporary doctrine.
183
 Indeed, no one contends that 
 
 
Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included 
exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely 
unpopular and wrongheaded views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the 
very product of an interest balancing by the people . . . .”). 
 179. For accounts of the structure of free-speech doctrine and the variety of tests that are used to 
assess different types of regulation, see, for example, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 61.1 (8th ed. 2010); and 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2:61 to :72 (2009). 
 180. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in 
an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 270–72 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & 
WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
FELL SILENT (2002)); Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18–
23 (2012); Christopher A. Chrisman, Mind the Gap: The Missing Standard of Review Under the 
Second Amendment (and Where to Find It), 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 319–31 (2006); Kenneth 
A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free 
Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 
429, 441–43 (2014); David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 
TENN. L. REV. 417, 449–78 (2014); Lund, supra note 27, at 1375–76; Miller, supra note 153, at 1297–
303; L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311, 
1398–402 (1997); Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and 
“Government Buildings”, 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 574–84 (2014); William Van Alstyne, The Second 
Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1254 (1994); Janice Baker, 
Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms into 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 57–59 (2002); Gary E. Barnett, Note, The 
Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 621–28 
(2008). 
 181. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 
Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 197–98 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010); State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 
789, 794 n.3 (Minn. 2013). 
 182. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865, 883 n.11 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 183. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (“The 
framers of the First Amendment make it plain that they regarded freedom of speech as very important . 
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contemporary doctrine is premised on the original meaning of the First 
Amendment; to the contrary, as Chief Justice Roberts put it during the 
Heller argument, “[T]hese standards that apply in the First Amendment 
just kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First 
Amendment picked up.”184 Nor is there historical evidence that the First 
and Second Amendments were understood to have parallel original 
meanings.
185
 Thus, in terms of original meaning, there is slight support 
that borrowing First Amendment jurisprudence would supply a basis for 
an authentically originalist Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
In any event, the similarities between the First and Second Amendment 
are more apparent than real. The First Amendment does not identify a 
purpose for which speech and the press receive protection; it instead seems 
to offer protection for written and oral expression without any particular 
instrumental objective in mind. Indeed, the Court has resolutely rejected 
linking First Amendment protection to any discrete instrumental objective. 
Instead, the Court tells us that anything conveying some sort of idea is 
eligible for First Amendment protection,
186
 and that the First Amendment 
protects not only “discussion of governmental affairs” but also “expression 
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical 
 
 
. . . But they say very little about its exact meaning.”); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE 
PRESS 281 (1985) (“[W]e do not know what the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-and-press 
clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at the time that they did so. Moreover, they were 
themselves at that time sharply divided and possessed no distinct understanding either.”); LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 23 
(1991) (“[I]t is simply impossible to turn to discussions by the framers . . . for definitive answers on 
the scope of freedom of the press.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME 42 (2004) (“[T]he framers of the First Amendment . . . embraced a broad and largely 
undefined constitutional principle, not a concrete, well-settled legal doctrine.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 52 (2010) (“[T]he actual views of the drafters and ratifiers of the First 
Amendment are in many ways unclear.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political 
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 307 (1978) 
(“History tells us little . . . about the precise meaning contemplated by those who drafted the Bill of 
Rights.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 
(1971) (“[T]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech . . . .”); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of 
Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (2011) (“[T]he evidence regarding the original meaning of the Speech 
and Press Clauses is anything but easy to sort out.”). 
 184. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 
07-290). 
 185. For a discussion of the evidence on this point, see Charles, supra note 153, at 51–54.  
 186. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (video games); 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989) (burning flag as part of protest); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (wearing black armband as part of antiwar 
protest); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966) (plurality opinion) (silent sit-in to protest 
segregation). 
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matters.”187 Even “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection,” since the First Amendment 
embraces “the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music 
of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”188 As a 
consequence, any governmental interest in suppressing expression is 
considered impermissible: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.”189  
Second Amendment rights have a far different character. Gregory 
Magarian has argued that it is difficult to analogize between expression 
and the right to keep and bear arms, since speech serves a far broader set 
of purposes and has a far more tenuous relation to concrete harms inflicted 
on others than the right to keep and bear arms.
190
 He and Mark Tushnet 
have also observed that First Amendment jurisprudence cannot easily be 
applied to firearms regulation because firearms regulation can never be 
firearms-neutral in the way that speech regulation can be content-neutral; 
any regulation triggered by the content of speech or expression is 
considered suspect under the First Amendment, while gun-control laws—
even those characterized as presumptively lawful in Heller—necessarily 
focus on the manner in which firearms are possessed or carried.
191
 Yet, 
even these criticisms understate the problems with constructing Second 
Amendment jurisprudence by borrowing First Amendment doctrine.  
Heller concluded that the individual right to keep and bear arms was 
codified to protect the interest in lawful armed defense and that regulations 
that impermissibly impinge on that interest are invalid. Indeed, Heller 
cautioned that the Second Amendment right “[i]s not a right to keep and 
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose” and invalidated the challenged ordinance because it “makes it 
impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose of 
self-defense.”192 Consequently, as we have seen, lower courts have applied 
 
 
 187. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
 188. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(citation omitted). 
 189. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. Accord, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002). For a useful, though critical, description of 
the leading philosophical theories that have been advanced to support constitutional protection for 
expression, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–59 (1982). 
 190. See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 55–58 (2012).  
 191. See id. at 63–64; Tushnet, supra note 46, at 430–31. 
 192. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 630 (2008). 
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Heller in a fashion that assesses the extent to which a challenged 
regulation burdens the core interest in lawful defense. Accordingly, it 
would be anomalous to borrow a free-speech and free-press jurisprudence 
developed with no discrete instrumental objective in mind and apply it to a 
Second Amendment right formulated with reference to precisely such an 
objective. First Amendment protection, in other words, is not 
consequentialist, but Second Amendment protection, Heller tells us, is, 
and deeply so.  
Two examples illustrate the point. First, consider again laws that 
prohibit the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Heller treats these 
regulations as presumptively lawful, and there are serious arguments for 
sustaining such laws, which have been consistently upheld by appellate 
courts since Heller.
193
 In the First Amendment context, however, the Court 
long ago held that the right to speak or publish cannot be denied as a result 
of past misconduct, such as the publication of false and defamatory 
material, under the framing-era rule against prior restraints on 
publication.
194
 It has also held that convicted felons retain First 
Amendment rights, even when writing about the crime for which they 
were convicted.
195
 If the Second Amendment is properly understood to 
permit prohibitions on possessing firearms by convicted felons, there must 
be some fundamental difference between First Amendment and Second 
Amendment rights. 
Second, consider laws that provide for enhanced penalties when a 
firearm is used or carried during the commission of a substantive crime. 
Since Heller, these laws have also been routinely upheld against Second 
Amendment attack.
196
 In light of Heller’s admonition that the Second 
Amendment is directed at protection of an interest in lawful armed 
defense, this result seems correct. Conversely, First Amendment doctrine 
insists that all speech receive equal treatment regardless of its 
communicative effects.
197
 Thus, while all expression within the scope of 
 
 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 194. See Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–23 (1931). 
 195. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 
(1991) (invalidating statute requiring publishers to pay into a crime victims fund sums owed to authors 
for works describing crimes that the authors were accused or convicted of committing). 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 368–70 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. 
Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); People v. Cisneros, 2014 WL 1671766, at *4–6 (Colo. 
App. Apr. 24, 2014). 
 197. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992); Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–23, 334 (1988). 
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the First Amendment’s protection is normally afforded protection, Heller 
appears to condition constitutional protection on the purpose for which 
individuals keep and bear arms.
198
 This similarly suggests a fundamental 
difference between First and Second Amendment rights. 
In short, any effort to construct a Second Amendment jurisprudence 
using First Amendment principles is deeply problematic. The character of 
these constitutional protections seems far too disparate to give rise to 
fruitful doctrinal borrowing. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR FIREARMS REGULATION 
Thus far, the search for an authentic Second Amendment originalism 
has borne little fruit. If the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause is taken literally, there appears to be little basis for 
limiting anyone’s ability to possess or carry firearms in common civilian 
use. Yet, this is inconsistent with the approach taken in Heller, its 
application in lower courts, and the history of firearms regulation. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to reconcile an understanding of the Second 
Amendment’s original meaning with Heller’s dicta on permissible 
regulation, its focus on a core interest in lawful armed defense, and the 
history of firearms regulation. Perhaps for these reasons, some 
commentators have argued that the scope of permissible firearms 
regulation has its basis in popular sentiment rather than the Constitution’s 
text.
199
 But there is something deeply anomalous about reading the 
individual rights protected by the Constitution to ensure that the scope of 
regulatory authority mirrors public sentiment. After all, there is little 
reason to believe that a Bill of Rights is necessary to ensure that elected 
officials hew to the public’s sensibilities about gun control or any other 
issue. As Justice Scalia has put it: “If the Constitution were . . . a novel 
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to 
believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the 
legislature?”200 Surely the more persuasive account is that the purpose and 
effect of codifying an individual right as constitutional law is to protect it 
 
 
 198. Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some Notes on Firearms, the Second 
Amendment, and “Reasonable Regulation”, 75 TENN. L. REV. 137, 148 (2007) (“[T]he Second 
Amendment’s right to arms is about capabilities more than expression.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Leider, supra note 106, at 1650–51; Siegel, supra note 27, at 236–45. 
 200. Scalia, supra note 17, at 854. This is not a concern only of originalists such as Justice Scalia; 
the quintessentially nonoriginalist John Ely made essentially the same point. See JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63–69 (1980). 
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against the vagaries of popular opinion.
201
 If Second Amendment 
jurisprudence is properly understood to sustain gun-control laws when 
they reflect majoritian sensibilities rather than hewing to the constitutional 
text, perhaps the courts have made a wrong turn. 
There is, however, one more source of regulatory authority to consider, 
one that has been hiding in plain sight.  
A. Regulatory Power and the Preamble 
It is time to return to the Second Amendment’s preamble. After all, by 
referring to the existence of “[a] well regulated Militia,”202 the Second 
Amendment’s preamble, rather than abolishing the regulatory power over 
the militia conferred by Article I,
203
 expressly contemplates continued 
regulatory authority, whether by Congress or the States.
204
 Moreover, 
Heller concluded that the original meaning of the term “Militia” refers not 
to “the organized militia,” but rather “all able-bodied men.”205 The Court 
added that the “militia” was originally understood as comprised of “the 
body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts 
of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.”206 Thus, 
the class that is to be “well regulated” consists of all who are able-bodied 
and capable of military service, regardless of whether they are actually 
enrolled in an organized militia. In short, Heller treats the militia and those 
entitled to exercise the right to keep and bear arms as, for all practical 
 
 
 201. Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts.”). 
 202. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 203. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.16 (conferring power on Congress to “[t]o provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . and the Authority of training the Militia according 
to the discipline prescribed by Congress”).  
 204. Even after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress and the States continued to exercise 
concurrent authority to regulate the militia. See Charles, supra note 103, at 5–7, 69–71. 
 205. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008). The Court added that the first 
Militia Act, enacted the year after the Second Amendment’s ratification, defined the militia as “each 
and every able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of 
the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years.” Id. (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 
33, 1 Stat. 271). 
 206. Id. at 627. This capacious definition of “Militia” is consistent with that of most scholars who 
have advanced the view that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. See, e.g., Kates, 
supra note 96, at 214–18; McAfee & Quinlan, supra note 96, at 807–22; Eugene Volokh, The 
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 810–12 (1998). But see Nelson Lund, 
D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 229, 240–41 (2008) (arguing that the “Militia” in the preamble and “the people” in the 
operative clause differ). 
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purposes, synonyms. Moreover, because the framing-era understanding 
was that the right would be exercised by those subject to regulatory 
authority, it would do serious violence to this original understanding to 
disaggregate the right from the existence of regulatory authority. After all, 
the framing-era understanding was that the right would be exercised by 
individuals subject to regulation.
207
  
As for the phrase “well regulated,” the first edition of Webster’s 
dictionary defined “regulated” as “[a]djusted by rule, method or forms; put 
in good order; subjected to rules or restrictions.”208 Heller stated that the 
original meaning of the phrase was “the imposition of proper discipline 
and training.”209 These terms, of course, are expansive, contemplating not 
merely training but also rules and “discipline,” which could conceivably 
embrace everything from a forfeiture of the right to keep and bear arms as 
a consequence of misconduct to a variety of prophylactic measures that 
endeavor to reduce the likelihood of misconduct.
210
 Thus, the preamble 
indicates that the Second Amendment preserves substantial regulatory 
authority. 
 
 
 207. One scholar has wondered whether a militia-based regulatory power might not reach “those 
too old or too feeble to serve in the militia.” Michael C. Dorf, Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: 
Or Why the Activity/Inactivity Distinction in the Health Care Case Was Really About the Right to 
Bodily Integrity, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 906 (2013). This possible limitation on regulatory power 
seems to have little practical significance—debates over gun control rarely center on its application to 
the aged or infirm. In any event, the history of firearms regulation, as we have seen, has never limited 
regulatory authority to those regarded as capable of militia service. To the contrary, those regarded as 
unable to serve in the militia, such as loyalists or free blacks in the framing era and convicted felons 
thereafter, were still regarded as subject to regulatory authority. If history is any guide, regulatory 
power seems to have been regarded as comprehensive if only to ensure that the privileges associated 
with militia service were limited to those subject to regulation as part of the militia. In any event, given 
the relation between the preamble and the operative clauses of the Second Amendment, it seems plain 
that the preamble expresses the circumstances under which the right could be exercised—that is, those 
exercising the right should comprise a “well regulated militia.” The framing-era understanding, in 
short, is that the right could not be considered except when subject to regulatory authority. 
 208. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 31, at 54. To similar effect, see 2 JOHNSON, supra note 32, at cdlxxvi 
(defining “regulate” as “[t]o adjust by rule or method” or “[t]o direct”). 
 209. Heller, 554 U.S. at 597. 
 210. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 153, at 1318–19 (“The imposition of proper discipline assumes 
someone with authority to impose discipline and presumes some consequence for drilling without 
adequate discipline. . . . [O]nce the people exercise their right to keep and bear arms as a people’s 
militia and spill out into the street, then that right is textually constrained by the militia clauses in the 
Constitution. Those clauses curtail the authority of the people’s militia to assemble spontaneously.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Winkler, supra note 26, at 707 (“Training and discipline does not simply happen; 
laws must be adopted to ensure that the people are properly educated about guns and that the people 
understand the rules governing the use of guns. Discipline implies control, and the state disciplines 
individual gun users by teaching them the rules and by punishing them for failure to obey. . . . Some 
measure of regulatory authority, even though its precise contours are unclear, does seem to be called 
for by the text.”). For a discussion of the evidence demonstrating that the framing generation regarded 
broad and effective regulation of the militia as critical, see Charles, supra note 103, at 87–97.  
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This understanding of the regulatory authority preserved by the 
preamble explains a great deal. The original meaning of the Second 
Amendment’s operative clause, as explicated in Heller, offers no apparent 
basis for any limitation on the right of an individual to possess or carry 
firearms in common civilian use, nor does it appear to concern itself with a 
core interest in lawful armed defense. Yet, Heller acknowledges that the 
preamble can be used to shed light on the operative clause; it explains that 
“[l]ogic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the 
command,” and that this “requirement of logical connection may cause a 
prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause,” thereby 
serving the preamble’s “clarifying function.”211 Although the Court found 
no ambiguity in the original meaning of the phrase “the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms,”212 it made no such claim regarding the term 
“infringed” in the operative clause. Indeed, both the Court’s dicta on 
permissible firearms regulation and its precise holding suggest a good deal 
of ambiguity in that term. In any event, nothing in Heller suggests that the 
operative clause should be read in a manner inconsistent with the 
preamble; just as Heller concluded that the preamble could not be read to 
limit the operative clause, it would be untenable to read the operative 
clause to render nugatory the regulatory authority acknowledged in the 
preamble. The two clauses must be harmonized, not placed in conflict with 
each other. Understanding the preamble as supplying a textual 
acknowledgement that not all regulation amounts to an “infringement” on 
the right to keep and bear arms, in turn, solves a good number of textual 
problems lurking in Heller’s treatment of firearms regulation. The Second 
Amendment, read in light of its preamble, reflects a textual commitment to 
regulation found nowhere else in the Bill of Rights.
213
  
It is therefore unsurprising that history yields ample evidence of 
expansive regulatory authority over firearms, as Part II.A above reflects. 
Indeed, the right to keep and bear arms has long been understood to permit 
prophylactic regulation, including prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by classes of individuals seen as posing unacceptable risks to 
public safety, such as Catholics at the time of the English Bill of Rights or 
 
 
 211. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–78.  
 212. Id. at 579–92. 
 213. One commentator, for example, has observed that in other areas of constitutional law, there is 
usually not a tolerance for broad, categorical prophylactic regulation similar to the type of regulation 
that is seemingly permitted under the Second Amendment. See Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality 
of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 951, 1004–05, 1032–33 (2011). The preamble’s 
acknowledgement of regulatory authority, however, explains the unique breadth of regulatory 
authority in this context. 
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free Blacks and loyalists in the framing era. The Second Amendment also 
seems to have been understood to permit prophylactic regulation where 
firearms were carried under circumstances regarded as suspicious, such as 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons. If the right coexists with 
broad regulatory power, then these limitations on the right to keep and 
bear arms become textually comprehensible. Moreover, since the preamble 
preserves regulatory authority in a generic manner, rather than 
endeavoring to preserve framing-era practice as in the Seventh 
Amendment, it becomes possible to explain why the right to keep and bear 
arms tolerates regulations unknown in the framing era. 
To be sure, the preamble does not contemplate limitless regulation. For 
one thing, a boundless regulatory power could convert the right into a 
nullity, which is not a plausible reconciliation of the operative clause and 
the preamble. For another, as Nelson Lund has observed, “something can 
only be ‘well regulated’ when it is not overly regulated or inappropriately 
regulated.”214 Yet, beyond its recognition of both a right and a regulatory 
power that evidently must be tailored in some appropriate way, the text 
offers nothing like a doctrinal formula for reconciling right and regulatory 
authority.  
When constitutional text is written at a high level of generality, original 
meaning will frequently be insufficient to resolve many interpretive 
questions. For this reason, even many originalists acknowledge that there 
are occasions on which original meaning is insufficient to resolve a 
constitutional debate, necessitating resort to what they label nonoriginalist 
“construction.”215 Nonoriginalists, for their part, cheerfully acknowledge 
that the interpretation of constitutional text must often be supplemented by 
judicially created doctrine because of the inadequacy of the text to resolve 
any number of constitutional controversies.
216
 Whether labeled 
“constitutional construction” or “living constitutionalism,” the frequently 
acknowledged necessity to resort to nonoriginalist doctrine to address 
 
 
 214. Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and 
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 157, 175 (1999) (emphasis removed). 
 215. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 21, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 21, at 118–30; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 21, at 5–14; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 467–72 (2013); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Originalism’s 
Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 147, 173–76. 
 216. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7–101 (2001); 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 79–107 (2004); Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1655–67 (2005). 
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matters on which the Constitution’s text is inconclusive reflects the limits 
of originalism as a vehicle for constitutional adjudication. 
The Second Amendment presents a case study in the limits of 
originalism. Even accepting Heller’s originalist methodology and its 
account of original meaning, originalism is of highly limited utility in 
developing Second Amendment jurisprudence. This observation surely 
leads one to question the utility of the originalist project—if even Heller 
cannot produce an authentically originalist jurisprudence, what might 
originalism offer constitutional adjudication? Perhaps the original meaning 
of constitutional text, when drafted at a high level of generality as is so 
often the case, is simply too abstract to offer much useful guidance for 
constitutional adjudication.
217
 That seems to be the case with the Second 
Amendment, with its text offering only the broadest hint at the relationship 
between right and regulatory power. 
Consider, then, the possibilities that nonoriginalist construction offers 
for reconciling firearms rights and regulatory authority. Constitutional law 
is, after all, replete with instances of nonoriginalist construction. One type 
of nonoriginalist construction—the requirement that legislation have at 
least a rational basis (a standard that no one contends is rooted in original 
meaning)—was rejected by Heller as duplicative of other constitutional 
protections that require that challenged regulations have a rational basis.
218
 
Conversely, the most rigorous, if nonoriginalist, approach to judicial 
review is strict scrutiny, which requires that a challenged law “is justified 
by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest.”219 Some commentators have argued for strict scrutiny on the 
view that it has long been regarded as appropriate for individual rights 
regarded as fundamental.
220
 Yet, under many other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, the propriety of challenged regulations is not judged by strict 
scrutiny even if those rights are regarded as fundamental, as Adam 
Winkler has demonstrated.
221
 In any event, the preamble provides textual 
and even originalist reasons to reject strict scrutiny. 
 
 
 217. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. 
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31–64 (1991). 
 218. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.27 (2008).  
 219. E.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 220. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate, McDonald v. 
Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 
455–57 (2011) (Malcolm); Kyle Hatt, Note, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second Amendment’s Original 
Purpose in District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505, 520–21 (2011). 
 221. See Winkler, supra note 26, at 696700; Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About 
Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 228–32 (2006). For a similar argument, see Fleming 
& McClain, supra note 56, at 861–68. 
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The text of the Second Amendment, read in light of its preamble as 
well as the history of firearms regulation, powerfully suggests ample 
power to enact prophylactic regulations. Plainly, a “well regulated Militia” 
could well be one subject to a variety of prophylactic rules intended to 
minimize the likelihood of misconduct, rather than only to rules that 
punish misconduct after the fact. Indeed, we have seen prophylactic 
firearms regulation throughout history, from the early nineteenth-century 
prohibitions on concealed carry to the more recent prohibition on the 
possession of firearms by violent misdemeanants. This textual and 
historical commitment to regulation means an invariable requirement of 
strict scrutiny would be anomalous. For one thing, the myriad 
methodological difficulties in demonstrating the effect of any one 
regulation in isolation on crime rates would make it difficult to mount a 
convincing empirical demonstration that a particular regulation was 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
222
 For 
another, the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny forbids regulations 
that are significantly over- or underinclusive.
223
 In the First Amendment 
context, for example, the Court has held that a statutory prohibition on 
corporate-funded electioneering could not be justified as a means to 
prevent corruption because the prohibition swept beyond the type of 
corrupt quid pro quo that the government has a compelling interest in 
preventing.
224
 Yet, prophylactic regulations are necessarily over- or 
underinclusive; for example, not all those who carry concealed weapons 
do so to commit crimes, and not all convicted felons recidivate.
225
 Both the 
textual basis for and longstanding acceptance of prophylactic regulation, in 
short, strongly argue against an invariable requirement of strict scrutiny. 
With the problems inherent to rational-basis review and strict scrutiny, 
and in light of the requirement that the militia must be “well regulated,” an 
intermediate form of review might prove tempting. Yet, as Part I.B above 
indicates, Heller suggests that very serious burdens on the core 
constitutional interest in armed defense amount to a virtually per se 
infringement of the right to keep and bear arms. Beyond that, if original 
 
 
 222. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 56, at 1464–69. For a more general discussion of the difficulties 
in assembling empirical evidence of the efficacy of gun-control laws, see MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF 
RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 77–85 (2007). 
 223. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–42; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543–46 (1993); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 
221, 231–32 (1987); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 792–95 (1978).  
 224. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).  
 225. For an argument that none of the examples of presumptively lawful regulations offered in 
Heller can be reconciled with strict scrutiny, see Larson, supra note 38, at 1379–85.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1236 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1187 
 
 
 
 
meaning is to set the boundaries for permissible nonoriginalist 
construction, a nonoriginalist construction must accommodate both the 
right found in the operative clause and the regulatory authority 
acknowledged in the preamble.  
The task of reconciling a core right and legitimate regulatory interests 
is not a new one in constitutional law. It has frequently been addressed 
through a methodology that assesses the extent of the burden placed on the 
core right by a challenged regulation. For example, the First Amendment 
protects the right to vote and to participate in the political process, but 
there are nonetheless legitimate governmental interests that support 
regulation of the electoral process. The Court mediates between right and 
regulation by imposing strict scrutiny on regulations imposing what are 
regarded as severe burdens on First Amendment rights, while regulations 
imposing more modest burdens are upheld if reasonable.
226
 Thus, the 
Court evaluates regulations that compel disclosure of the identities of 
those involved in the political process through a test that weighs the 
strength of the governmental interest in disclosure against the magnitude 
of the burden imposed on First Amendment rights.
227
 Similarly, content-
neutral regulation of speech is upheld if it does not burden substantially 
more speech than necessary to further a legitimate governmental interest, 
an inquiry that turns in significant part on the magnitude of the burden 
imposed by the challenged regulation.
228
 And, because public employees 
have a constitutionally protected interest in speaking on matters of public 
concern, restrictions on public-employee speech require heightened 
justifications to the extent that a challenged regulation imposes 
particularly great burdens on employee free speech.
229
  
This mode of inquiry is not unique to free-speech jurisprudence. For 
example, while the Constitution secures both a right to travel and a right of 
access to the courts, the Court upheld a durational residency requirement 
to obtain a divorce because it imposed no absolute bar to travel or access 
to the courts and advanced legitimate governmental interests in assuring 
 
 
 226. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008) (opinion of 
Stevens, J.); id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451–52 (2008); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592–97 (2005); 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
428, 433–34 (1992); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760–62 (1973). 
 227. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010).  
 228. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213–17 (1997). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–70 (1995). 
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that an individual has an adequate attachment to the forum state before it 
endeavors to adjudicate an action for divorce.
230
  
Perhaps most familiar, however, is the Court’s approach to abortion 
regulation, where the Court has been careful to protect both right and 
regulatory authority.
231
 In Roe v. Wade,
232
 the Court concluded that a 
woman had a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in 
deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy,
233
 but it also acknowledged 
that the government had a legitimate interest in safeguarding health, 
maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life.
234
 The Court 
endeavored to accommodate these conflicting interests by holding that 
after the first trimester the government may regulate abortion to protect 
maternal health but may not regulate to protect potential life until 
viability.
235
  
Subsequently, in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,
236
 the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
concluded that this framework gave insufficient weight to the concededly 
legitimate governmental interest in protecting potential life by requiring 
that “any regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive 
strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a 
compelling state interest.”237 Instead, “[o]nly where state regulation 
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does 
the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”238 Later, when upholding a statutory prohibition on 
“intact dilation and extraction” or “partial-birth abortion,” the Court 
explained that “[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose 
an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain 
 
 
 230. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 405–09 (1975). 
 231. Notably, even one scholarly advocate of a vigorous conception of the right to bear arms has 
argued, “[T]he ideas and principles used . . . to draw the unenumerated right to abortion out of the 
Constitution run remarkably parallel to, and in core cases build directly upon, arguments and 
principles supporting a constitutional right to arms for self-defense.” Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply 
Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault 
Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1309–10 (2009). See also Fleming 
& McClain, supra note 56, at 866–67; Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: 
Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1437 (2009). 
 232. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 233. Id. at 153. 
 234. Id. at 153–54. 
 235. Id. at 163–64. 
 236. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 237. Id. at 871 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 238. Id. at 874 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). Accord, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000). 
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procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate 
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect 
for life.”239 After concluding that the statute advanced this legitimate 
interest by banning “a procedure itself laden with the power to devalue 
human life,”240 the Court considered whether the statute created an undue 
burden in light of the “documented medical disagreement whether the 
Act’s prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women,” 
and concluded that legislatures enjoy “wide discretion to pass legislation 
in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”241 
Although none of these contexts is precisely analogous to firearms 
regulation, in each of them, the Court confronted both a core right and a 
legitimate governmental interest in regulating the exercise of a right 
itself—not merely the type of incidental burden created by regulations not 
directed at the exercise of the right itself.
242
 Sufficiently serious burdens 
that threaten to negate the right are invalidated, or at least subjected to 
demanding review, while less serious burdens can be sustained under less 
demanding review.
243
 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the emerging 
 
 
 239. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 162–63. 
 242. Laws that are not triggered by the exercise of a right are generally thought to impose only 
incidental burdens and accordingly trigger more deferential review. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 67–68 (2006) (law requiring military access to law 
school recruiting series applied to schools who object to military policies); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 877–80 (1990) (law prohibiting use of controlled substances applied to religious-motivated 
user); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704–07 (1986) (law requiring closure of business 
constituting a public nuisance applied to a bookstore); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–
89 (1985) (prohibiting individual from entering a military base applied to demonstrator). 
 243. This point likely explains the single case to embrace a rule of strict scrutiny for firearms 
regulation. In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
granted, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), the majority of a divided Sixth Circuit 
panel utilized strict scrutiny to conclude that a federal prohibition on the possession of firearms by 
individuals who had been committed to a mental institution was unconstitutional as applied to an 
individual who had been committed decades earlier and who was unable to petition for relief from the 
disability because he resided in a state that offers no relief from this disability, at least absent evidence 
of the individual’s current dangerousness. See id. at 313–15, 331–34, 342–44. The statute at issue 
imposed a particularly severe burden on individuals subject to its prohibition absent a legislative 
determination that persons subject to the disability posed an unreasonable risk; indeed, the court 
stressed that Congress, by permitting states to offer relief from the statutory disability, “has already 
determined that the class of individuals previously committed to a mental institution is not so 
dangerous that all members must be permanently deprived of firearms.” Id. at 333. Thus, the majority 
could well have been correct to apply strict scrutiny to the case before it, even if its more general 
comments on the propriety of strict scrutiny cannot be reconciled with the scope of regulatory 
authority contemplated by the Second Amendment’s preamble. Indeed, the court’s opinion implies that 
it grasped that it is the extent and character of the burden imposed by a challenged regulation and not 
the standard of scrutiny alone that is critical to post-Heller jurisprudence. See id. at 329 (“The courts of 
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Second Amendment jurisprudence in lower courts since Heller has latched 
onto an inquiry into the extent of the burden imposed on core Second 
Amendment interests by a challenged regulation; this mode of 
nonoriginalist construction is familiar to constitutional law when right and 
legitimate regulatory authority must be reconciled.  
Importantly, an approach that keys judicial scrutiny to the extent to 
which a challenged regulation burdens the core right has the virtue of 
minimizing the extent to which the judiciary must engage in difficult 
predictive or empirical judgments about the efficacy of the challenged 
regulation.
244
 Since very severe burdens are virtually per se invalid, little 
inquiry into their justification will be required beyond that typical in strict-
scrutiny litigation, but for less severe burdens, a degree of deference to 
legislative judgment is appropriate. Not only does the Second Amendment 
reflect a textual commitment to regulation, the historical understanding of 
the Second Amendment reflects acceptance of prophylaxis. For example, 
persons thought to pose unreasonable risks have long been regarded within 
the ambit of regulatory power. Consider the framing-era limitation on the 
right to bear arms to loyal white males, the nineteenth-century prohibitions 
on carrying concealed firearms, and the more recent prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by convicted felons and dangerous misdemeanants 
discussed in Part II above. Each of these illustrates the historical 
acceptance of prophylaxis, which, after all, seems to follow from the 
Second Amendment’s preamble. A militia could hardly be “well 
regulated” if it contained individuals that present undue threats to public 
safety.  
Thus, history suggests that when the legislature restricts the possession 
of firearms by discrete classes of individuals reasonably regarded as 
posing an elevated risk for firearms violence, prophylactic regulations of 
this character should be sustained. For example, Mary Fan has argued that 
available crime data strongly suggests that individuals with a history of 
intimate-partner conflict or domestic violence present a sharply elevated 
risk of firearms violence.
245
 Surely regulations premised on data of this 
character stand on better footing than framing-era regulations premised on 
archaic generalizations poorly adapted to contemporary circumstances. 
 
 
appeals’ post-Heller jurisprudence does not suggest that the decision to apply intermediate scrutiny 
over strict scrutiny was generally the crucial keystone that won the government’s case.”). 
 244. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790–91 (2010) (plurality opinion) (warning 
against “requir[ing] judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions and thus to make 
difficult empirical judgments in an area in which they lack expertise”). 
 245. See Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary 
Violence, 90 IND. L.J. 151, 168–72 (2015). 
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Moreover, as courts applying Heller have concluded, difficulties in 
assessing the efficacy of prophylactic regulation and the long history of 
permitting such regulation without demanding rigorous empirical proof of 
efficacy suggest that deference should be given to legislative conclusions 
on questions of efficacy, except where regulations impose the most severe 
burdens on Second Amendment rights.
246
 
All this may strike the reader as a bit abstract. For that reason, the 
discussion below applies this framework to some specific regulatory 
regimes. To be sure, there may be any number of policy and technological 
objections to the regulatory options considered below. Indeed, assessing 
the wisdom and utility of firearms regulation presents many challenges. 
And in addition to the formidable methodological challenges considered 
above,
247
 research into firearms-related violence has been handicapped by 
a variety of restrictions imposed on government funding for such research 
in recent years.
248
 “As a result, the past 20 years have witnessed 
diminished progress in understanding the causes and effects of firearm 
violence.”249 Accordingly, the state of the research hampers that inquiry. 
Nevertheless, the remaining discussion will focus on a number of areas of 
potential regulation to illustrate that the Second Amendment, properly 
understood, tolerates quite a vigorous regime of gun control. The 
discussion is offered less as a concrete agenda than as a thought 
experiment to demonstrate the scope of regulatory authority that may be 
exercised consistent with the Second Amendment. 
B. Assault-Weapons Bans 
The character of constitutional review focusing on the extent to which 
a challenged restriction burdens the core constitutional interest in lawful 
armed defense is well illustrated by a prohibition on semi-automatic, 
assault-type weapons with military features, especially large-capacity 
magazines.  
 
 
 246. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2013); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 
980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 210 
n.21 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 756–57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).  
 247. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
 248. See, e.g., Arthur L. Kellermann & Frederick P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun 
Research, 309 JAMA 549 (2013). 
 249. COMM. ON PRIORITIES FOR A PUB. HEALTH RESEARCH AGENDA TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF 
FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 23 (Alan I. 
Leshner et al. eds., 2013). 
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There is some evidence that assault-type firearms and large-capacity 
magazines are frequently used in mass shooting incidents,
250
 and some 
reason to believe that prohibiting weapons that enable unusual rates of fire 
or that accept unusually large magazines, as well as a prohibition on such 
magazines, “may prevent some shootings, particularly those involving 
high numbers of shots and victims.”251 Critics have argued, however, that 
because such weapons are commonly owned by civilians for purposes of 
self-defense, and do not meaningfully differ from other types of semi-
automatic weapons, there is little point to a ban.
252
 Still, there is a case to 
be made for such laws. Although there is, unsurprisingly, little evidence of 
the efficacy of the now-lapsed federal ban on assault weapons given the 
ready availability of functional substitutes that were not prohibited by that 
law, there is some evidence that more comprehensive prohibitions on 
high-capacity, semi-automatic firearms reduce firearms violence.
253
 
Critics, however, remain unpersuaded.
254
 
Despite the uncertain empirical evidence on the efficacy of a 
comprehensive prohibition on such weapons, there is a strong case to be 
made for their constitutionality. Heller ensures protection for handguns 
with typical features, since handguns are “the quintessential self-defense 
weapon.”255 Thus, the burden on the core right of armed defense imposed 
by a prohibition on assault-type weapons is modest. As Professor Volokh, 
generally an advocate of expansive firearms rights, acknowledges: “[B]ans 
on such weapons don’t substantially burden the right to keep and bear 
arms for self-defense, precisely because equally useful guns remain 
available.”256 Professor Volokh may be overstating things a bit; a weapon 
that can fire more rounds at a higher rate of speed may have some 
marginal utility for self-defense when compared to more traditional 
handguns.
257
 Still, in light of the modest burden that such a law likely 
imposes on lawful defense, and the potential benefits of such a prohibition, 
the approach that the Court has taken in other areas in which right and 
 
 
 250. Christopher S. Koper, America’s Experience with the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 1994-
2004: Key Findings and Implications, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 76, at 157, 161–62. 
 251. Id. at 168. 
 252. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 231, at 1292–302. For a historical survey demonstrating that 
high-capacity magazines have a lengthy history of civilian use, see David B. Kopel, The History of 
Firearms Magazines and of Magazine Prohibition, 78 ALB. L. REV. 849, 851–60 (2015). 
 253. See, e.g., Koper, supra note 250, at 162–69. 
 254. See, e.g., Gary Kleck, Gun Control After Heller and McDonald: What Cannot Be Done and 
What Ought To Be Done, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1383, 1397–99 (2012). 
 255. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
 256. Volokh, supra note 56, at 1489. 
 257. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 231, at 1302–09. 
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regulatory authority must be reconciled likely counsels for deference to the 
legislature’s judgment, even in the face of uncertain evidence of 
efficacy.
258
 
C. Comprehensive Firearms Registration and Tracing 
There is a serious case to be made for a comprehensive system of 
registration, thus enabling firearms, bullets, or cartridges recovered in 
connection with a crime to be readily traceable. Such a system could make 
it far easier to identify the perpetrators of firearms-related crime and far 
more difficult for criminals to acquire untraceable weapons and 
circumvent background checks. 
Under the current system of firearms tracing, when a firearm is 
recovered by the authorities in the course of a criminal investigation, only 
a crude system of tracing the firearm’s provenance is available. Law 
enforcement officials may request that the National Tracing Center 
perform a trace on a recovered firearm by contacting the manufacturer, 
requesting that the manufacturer identify the transferee that received it 
from that manufacturer, and then contacting subsequent transferees until 
the trace identifies the first sale at retail made by a licensed dealer.
259
 As 
tracing became more frequent in the 1990s, the utility of the trace database 
as a means of studying the illegal use of firearms increased.
260
  
The value of the trace database as a source of information for policy 
debate has been hampered in recent years as a consequence of a rider 
inserted into federal appropriations legislation prohibiting the release of 
trace data to the public.
261
 Even so, the trace data that is available offers 
some important insights. In particular, studies have consistently found that 
 
 
 258. For decisions upholding prohibitions on semi-automatic rifles or high-capacity magazines 
along these lines, see, for example, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 
2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. 
Zondorak, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491 (Ct. App. 2013); People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576 (Ct. App. 
2009). See also Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998–1001 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying 
preliminary injunction). 
 259. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, DEP’T OF TREAS., COMMERCE IN 
FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES 19–20 (2000). 
 260. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic 
and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 287–91 (2001). 
There are, to be sure, fierce critics of trace data who argue it is likely to represent a skewed sample. 
See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the 
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1271–76 (2009); David B. Kopel, 
Clueless: The Misuse of BATF Firearms Tracing Data, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 171, 173–80. 
 261. See Colin Miller, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Why the Tiahrt Amendment’s Ban on the 
Admissibility of ATF Trace Data in State Court Actions Violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 665, 676–82. 
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traced firearms are rarely recovered from those who bought the firearms at 
retail from a licensed dealer. For example, an analysis of crime-gun trace 
requests during calendar year 2000 in cities with populations greater than 
250,000 participating in a crime-gun interdiction initiative indicated that, 
of the trace requests in which both the purchaser and possessor at the time 
of recovery could be ascertained, in 88% the possessor and purchaser were 
not the same person.
262
 A study of trace requests in Chicago between 2009 
and 2013 similarly showed that only 7.8% of traced guns were recovered 
from the original buyer.
263
  
This pattern is also reflected in surveys of offenders. A survey of 
federal prisoners who used or carried a firearm during their offense of 
conviction found that 9.1% of inmates reported obtaining the firearm from 
a theft or burglary, 15.0% from a drug dealer, 8.7% from a fence or the 
black market, 35.4% from a family member or friend, and 3.4% reported 
that the firearm was either borrowed or given to them, while only 22.5% 
reported obtaining the gun from a retail transaction, either through a retail 
store (15%), a pawnshop (4.2%), a flea market (1.7%) or a gun show 
(1.7%).
264
 Even if we assume, unrealistically, that all retail sales were 
made by a licensed dealer, the vast majority of firearms were obtained 
elsewhere. This pattern is also reflected in other surveys of offenders, 
which have consistently found that the vast majority of firearms in the 
hands of offenders were not purchased from a licensed dealer.
265
   
 
 
 262. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, DEP’T OF TREASURY, CRIME GUN TRACE 
REPORTS (2000), at 29 (2002). 
 263. See Philip J. Cook et al., Some Sources of Crime Guns in Chicago: Dirty Dealers, Straw 
Purchasers, and Traffickers, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 740 (2015). A study of 1999 traces 
similarly found that only 11.2% of guns were recovered from the original buyer. See Glenn L. Pierce 
et al., Characteristics and Dynamics of Illegal Firearms Markets: Implications for a Supply-Side 
Enforcement Strategy, 21 JUST. Q. 391, 400 (2004). 
 264. JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL FIREARMS 
OFFENDERS, 1992–98, at 10 (2000). 
 265. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 87–88 (2014); JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTHS, 
GUNS, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA 47 tbl.3.6 (1995); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Illegal 
Supply of Firearms, 29 CRIME & JUST. 319, 332–33 & tbl.2; Daniel W. Webster et al., Preventing the 
Diversion of Guns to Criminals Through Effective Firearm Sales Laws, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE, 
supra note 76, at 109, 110 [hereafter Webster et al., Preventing the Diversion]; Daniel W. Webster et 
al., How Delinquent Youths Acquire Guns: Initial Versus Most Recent Gun Acquisitions, 79 J. URB. 
HEALTH 60, 62–65 (2002).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1244 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1187 
 
 
 
 
The existing regulatory scheme does much to explain offenders’ 
preferences for acquiring firearms outside of licensed dealers. As one 
study explained: 
It is easy to understand why offenders would prefer private sellers 
over licensed firearms dealers. Under federal law and laws in most 
states, firearms purchases from unlicensed private sellers require no 
background check or record keeping. The lack of record keeping 
requirements helps to shield an offender from law enforcement 
scrutiny if the gun were used in a crime and recovered by police. 
Indeed, of the offenders in the [Survey of Inmates in State 
Correctional Facilities] who were not prohibited from possessing a 
handgun prior to the crime leading to their incarceration, two-thirds 
had obtained their handguns in a transaction with a private seller.
266
  
There is also some evidence, based on both surveys and trace data, that 
newer guns are disproportionately represented among firearms used by 
criminals.
267
 In any event, it seems plain that there must be vigorous 
demand for firearms among offenders: “Each new cohort of violent 
criminals must obtain guns somewhere.”268  
Thus, the vast majority of armed offenders are able, without 
undergoing background checks, to obtain guns that cannot be traced to 
them. Consider, as a response to this state of affairs, a system of 
comprehensive firearms registration and tracing that might be adopted. All 
owners of firearms would be required to register them, and all new sales 
and other transfers would be registered as well. Registration data would be 
placed in a comprehensive database, and all subsequent transfers would be 
performed through a licensed dealer required to perform a background 
check and then register the transfer should the transferee prove eligible to 
possess firearms. Unregistered transfers would incur significant penalties, 
as would the failure to report the loss or theft of a firearm. Penalties could 
be enhanced if such a firearm were subsequently used in a crime. 
Moreover, whenever a firearm was transferred, it could be test-fired, and 
the unique rifling impressions left on the bullet or cartridge casings could 
be recorded in a national database that could be matched to bullets or 
 
 
 266. Webster et al., Preventing the Diversion, supra note 265, at 110. 
 267. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Interpreting the Empirical Evidence on Illegal Gun 
Market Dynamics, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 779, 784–88 (2012). 
 268. Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 63 (1995). For a helpful discussion of the evidence with respect to the 
prevalence of markets that supply firearms to criminals, see Braga et al., supra note 267, at 783–88, 
791. 
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casings recovered at crime scenes.
269
 New firearms and ammunition could 
also be microstamped with a unique serial number that could be recovered 
from spent ammunition or casings.
270
 Finally, to guard against the 
possibility of theft, the law might require that firearms be kept securely 
locked except when in the actual possession of their owners.
271
 There 
could also be a requirement that new firearms be equipped with 
technology that renders them inoperable except when in the possession of 
their owner.
272
 
This type of regulatory regime could have dramatic consequences for 
firearms-related crime. It would become far more difficult for offenders to 
acquire untraceable firearms if there were a credible threat of sanctions, 
not only against any individual found without a properly registered 
firearm, but also against any individual who transferred a firearm to 
another without registering it or who failed to report a lost or stolen 
firearm. After all, in this type of regulatory regime, whenever a firearm is 
recovered in a criminal investigation from someone other than the 
registered owner, the registered owner would face sanctions if he had 
failed to report the transfer, loss, or theft of the firearm. Firearms 
trafficking outside of licensed dealers would likely diminish greatly. 
Moreover, if all registered firearms produced traceable bullets or 
cartridges, there would be enormous risks in discharging firearms, not 
unlike leaving fingerprints or DNA at the scene of the crime. Presumably 
 
 
 269. For a consideration of the possibilities for such a system, see COMM. TO ASSESS THE 
FEASIBILITY, ACCURACY, & TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF A NAT’L BALLISTICS DATABASE, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING 223–51 (Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 
2008) [hereinafter BALLISTIC IMAGING]. For laws embodying this approach, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
29-7h (2012), and MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-131 (West 2011). 
 270. For a consideration of this possibility, see BALLISTIC IMAGING, supra note 269, at 255–71, 
and Jon S. Vernick, Daniel W. Webster & Katherine A. Vittes, Law and Policy Approaches To 
Keeping Guns from High-Risk People, in RECONSIDERING LAW AND POLICY DEBATES: A PUBLIC 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 153, 173–75 (John G. Culhane ed., 2011). For laws requiring the use of this 
technology, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 319109(7) (West 2012), and D.C. Code §§ 7-2504.08, 7-2505.03 
(West Supp. 2012). 
 271. See Cook, Molliconi & Cole, supra note 268, at 86. There is some evidence that this 
approach reduces rates of firearms theft. See AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUND., STOLEN 
FIREARMS: ARMING THE ENEMY 12 (2002). There is also some evidence that this approach can reduce 
accidental deaths and suicides. See Peter Cummings et al., State Gun Safe Storage Laws and Child 
Mortality Due to Firearms, 278 JAMA 1084, 1084 (1997); David C. Grossman et al., Gun Storage 
Practices and Risk of Youth Suicide and Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 293 JAMA 707, 711–13 
(2005); Vernick, Webster & Vittes, supra note 270, at 169–70; Daniel W. Webster et al., Association 
Between Youth-Focused Firearm Laws and Youth Suicides, 292 JAMA 594, 596–98 (2004). 
 272. For a discussion of this possibility, see Stephen P. Teret & Adam D. Mernit, Personalized 
Guns: Using Technology to Save Lives, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 76, at 173, 177–80, 
and Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, “Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix for Regulating the 
Secondary Market, 20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 38, 38–48 (2002). 
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such a system would greatly increase demand among criminals for older, 
unregistered firearms, but the resulting increase in price should produce a 
dampening effect on this illegal market, especially given the risks that 
would be run by those who transfer older firearms without registering the 
transfer. The limited empirical evidence available suggests that more 
stringent systems of regulation—ones that currently operate to increase the 
risks of supplying guns later used in crimes—reduce the flow of firearms 
to criminals.
273
 
What is particularly striking from a constitutional standpoint about 
such a regime of comprehensive regulation and tracing is that there is so 
little basis to challenge it under the Second Amendment. The classic 
objection to gun registration is that it is the first step toward 
confiscation.
274
 Although this kind of slippery-slope argument is familiar 
in legal discourse, there is widespread agreement that the existence of a 
constitutional right that stakes out an end-point of an otherwise slippery 
slope is one mechanism to defeat this type of claim.
275
 Heller functions in 
just this fashion; by securing an individual right to keep and bear arms, it 
undercuts a claim that registration could lead to confiscation.
276
 Moreover, 
registration has ample originalist support. In the framing era, militia laws 
frequently required individuals to produce their firearms at muster and 
have them registered.
277
  
Beyond that, a comprehensive system of registration and tracing 
imposes a negligible burden on the core interest in lawful armed defense 
 
 
 273. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & Glenn L. Pierce, Disrupting Illegal Firearms Markets in 
Boston: The Effects of Operation Ceasefire on the Supply of New Handguns to Criminals, 4 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 717, 737–44 (2005) (enhanced enforcement targeting firearms 
traffickers); Philip J. Cook et al., Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588, F610–12 (2007) 
(prohibition on handguns and aggressive police enforcement produce high transaction costs and a thin 
underground market); Daniel W. Webster, Jon S. Vernick & Maria T. Bulzacchelli, Effects of State-
Level Firearm Seller Accountability Policies on Firearm Trafficking, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 525, 525–27 
(2009) (more comprehensive regulation reduces incidence of gun trafficking); D.W. Webster et al., 
Effects of Undercover Police Stings of Gun Dealers on the Supply of New Guns to Criminals, 12 INJ. 
PREVENTION 225, 229–30 (2006) (undercover enforcement targeting dealers reduced flow of firearms 
to criminals); D.W. Webster, J.S. Vernick & L.M. Hepburn, Relationship Between Licensing, 
Registration, and Other Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of Crime Guns, 7 INJ. PREVENTION 184, 
186–89 (2001) (jurisdictions with greater regulation generated fewer guns used in crimes); Daniel W. 
Webster & Garen J. Wintemute, Effects of Policies Designed to Keep Firearms from High-Risk 
Individuals, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 21, 29–31 (2015) (same). 
 274. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 56, at 1630. 
 275. See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Camel’s Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, 
Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539, 580–91 (2003); Eugene Volokh, The 
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1047–48 (2003). 
 276. For similar observations, see, for example, Fleming & McClain, supra note 56, at 856–57, 
and Tushnet, supra note 231, at 1436. 
 277. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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central to Heller because it does not limit the ability of individuals to use 
properly licensed firearms for lawful purposes.
278
 Comprehensive 
registration also enhances the efficacy of regulations that validly prohibit 
classes of individuals, such as convicted felons, from possessing 
firearms.
279
 Moreover, a registration requirement that enhances traceability 
of recovered firearms, bullets, and casings makes it far riskier to use 
firearms unlawfully and imposes little burden on lawful defensive uses of 
firearms, as long as systems of registration and tracing can be 
implemented without dramatic increases in the cost of firearms or the time 
it takes to acquire one. Similarly, safe-storage laws impose little burden on 
armed defense as long as the firearms may lawfully remain available and 
readily operable when in the presence of the owner.
280
 Abortion 
jurisprudence, for example, instructs: “The fact that a law which serves a 
valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the 
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure 
an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”281 It is hard to understand 
why this rule should not have equal application to the Second Amendment 
in light of the textual basis for regulatory authority.
282
  
In sum, a system of comprehensive firearms registration and tracing, 
far more aggressive than anything on the current regulatory horizon, faces 
little in the way of a constitutional threat.  
 
 
 278. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 52, at 561 (“One consequence of the Court’s choice to place 
self-defense—as opposed to deterring governmental tyranny—at the core of the Second Amendment, 
however, is that proposals to require licensing or registration of guns or records of gun sales are less 
likely to face serious constitutional challenge.”). For judicial opinions upholding such laws, see, for 
example, Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 71–75 (1st Cir. 2012) (revocation of license 
because of misstatements in application), Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 773–75 (7th Cir. 
2009) (upholding registration requirement), and Lowery v. United States, 3 A.3d 1169, 1175–76 (D.C. 
2010) (upholding licensing requirement). 
 279. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 3 N.E.3d 288, 295–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (upholding licensing as 
a means of laws limiting high-risk groups from carrying firearms); Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 954 
N.E.2d 1128, 1130–31 & n.7 (Mass. 2011) (upholding licensing requirement as a means of enforcing 
prohibition on felons possessing firearms). 
 280. For judicial opinions along these lines, see, for example, Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961–67 (9th Cir. 2014), and Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 
500–04 (Mass. 2013). For a scholarly discussion justifying this conclusion, see Fleming & McClain, 
supra note 56, at 874–86. 
 281. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). This approach was applied to sustain a twenty-four-hour waiting period to 
receive an abortion despite the increases in cost and the burden that this policy would produce. See id. 
at 885–87. 
 282. Cf. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding $340 residential 
handgun licensing fee). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1248 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1187 
 
 
 
 
D. Carrying Firearms in Public 
Another important question is the scope of regulatory authority over 
those who carry firearms in public. Heller observes: “From Blackstone 
through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely 
explained that the right [to keep and bear arms] was not a right to keep and 
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.”283 While some persons carry firearms for lawful purposes, others 
carry firearms with different ends in mind. 
For example, there is considerable evidence that members of criminal 
street gangs carry firearms at elevated rates.
284
 The same is true of those 
involved in drug trafficking.
285
 This should not be surprising; those 
engaged in unlawful but intensively competitive enterprises will often turn 
to violence as a means of enhancing their position in illegal, if lucrative, 
markets. There is ample evidence that homicide spiked in major cities 
following the introduction of crack cocaine, which created new 
competitive opportunities and pressures.
286
 The prevalence of violent 
competition, in turn, is likely to increase the rate at which offenders carry 
firearms.  
Indeed, gang researchers have found that the prevalence of violence in 
gang-dominated neighborhoods serves to make firearms more pervasive in 
 
 
 283. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 284. See, e.g., SCOTT H. DECKER & BARRIK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILY, FRIENDS, 
AND VIOLENCE 175–76 (1996); JAMES C. HOWELL, GANGS IN AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES 218 (2012); 
SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 265, at 95–103; TERENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., GANGS AND 
DELINQUENCY IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 123–25, 131 (2003); Scott H. Decker, Youth Gangs 
and Violent Behavior, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 388, 
391–92 (Daniel J. Flannery et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR]; Beth Bjerregaard & Alan J. Lizotte, Gun Ownership and Gang Membership, 86 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 37, 46–53 (1995); C. Ronald Huff, Comparing the Criminal Behavior of Youth 
Gangs and at-Risk Youth, in AMERICAN YOUTH GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM 77, 83 (Finn-Aage 
Esbensen, Stephen G. Tibbetts & Larry Gaines eds., 2004) [hereinafter GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM]; 
Alan J. Lizotte et al., Factors Influencing Gun Carrying Among Young Urban Males over the 
Adolescent-Young Adult Life Course, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 811, 812–13 (2000). 
 285. See, e.g., SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 265, at 75–76, 83–93; Alfred Blumstein, Youth 
Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 29–31 (1995); 
Lizotte et al., supra note 284, at 814–16, 826–28. 
 286. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JACQUELINE COHEN, DIFFUSION PROCESSES IN HOMICIDE 
6–9 (1999); JAMES ALAN FOX, JACK LEVIN & KENNA QUINET, THE WILL TO KILL: MAKING SENSE OF 
SENSELESS MURDER 87–88 (rev. 2008); BENJAMIN PEARSON-NELSON, UNDERSTANDING HOMICIDE 
TRENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF A HOMICIDE EPIDEMIC 37–41 (2008); Alfred Blumstein & Richard 
Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S. Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1175, 
1209–10 (1998); Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, The Crime Drop and Beyond, 2 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 125, 131 (2006); Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth 
Violence in the United States, 29 CRIME AND JUST. 1, 21–31. 
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those communities.
287
 Researchers have similarly found that a perception 
of danger in high-crime neighborhoods becomes a stimulus for the 
carrying of firearms as a means of self-protection.
288
 As Jeffrey Fagan and 
Deanna Wilkinson’s ethnographic study of at-risk youth in New York 
explains, when inner-city youth live under the increasing threat of violence 
in an environment in which firearms are prevalent, not only are they more 
likely to arm themselves, but they become increasingly likely to respond 
to real or perceived threats and provocations with lethal violence, creating 
what Fagan and Wilkinson characterize as a contagion effect.
289
 A study of 
homicide in New York, for example, found evidence of what it 
characterized as a contagion effect, in which firearms violence stimulated 
additional firearms-related violence in nearby areas.
290
 Fagan and 
Wilkinson have labeled this phenomenon an “ecology of danger” in which 
the need to carry firearms and be prepared to use them came to be seen as 
essential.
291
 Ironically, this does not make those who carry firearms in 
high-crime neighborhoods safer; to the contrary, even though gang 
members carry firearms at elevated rates, they also experience vastly 
higher homicide victimization rates than the public at large.
292
  
 
 
 287. See, e.g., James C. Howell, Youth Gang Homicides: A Literature Review, 45 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 208, 216 (1999). 
 288. See BLUMSTEIN & COHEN, supra note 286, at 4–5; MARK R. POGREBIN, PAUL B. STRETESKY 
& N. PRABHA UNNITHAN, GUNS, VIOLENCE, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: THE OFFENDER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 69–71 (2009); SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 265, at 102–03, 110–13; Jeffrey Fagan & 
Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities, in 24 YOUTH 
VIOLENCE 105, 174 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998); David Hemenway et al., Gun 
Carrying Among Adolescents, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 44–47 (1996); Lizotte et al, supra note 
284, at 813–14; Paul B. Stretesky & Mark R. Pogrebin, Gang-Related Gun Violence: Socialization, 
Identity, and Self, 36 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 85, 105–08 (2007). 
 289. See Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 288, at 174.  
 290. See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, supra note 284, at 688, 701–10. For a similar finding 
about Chicago, see Elizabeth Griffiths & Jorge M. Chavez, Communities, Street Guns and Homicide 
Trajectories in Chicago, 1980–1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide Trends Across Space 
and Time, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 941, 965–69 (2004). 
 291. Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 288, at 174. 
 292. See, e.g., DECKER & VAN WINKLE, supra note 284, at 173; Armando Morales, A Clinical 
Model for the Prevention of Gang Violence and Homicide, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND GANG 
VIOLENCE 105, 111–12 (Richard C. Cervantes ed., 1992); Sudhir Venkatesh, The Financial Activity of 
a Modern American Street Gang, in GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 284, at 239, 242. Gang 
members also appear to experience other forms of violent victimization at elevated rates. See, e.g., 
Chris L. Gibson et al., Using Propensity Score Matching to Understand the Relationship Between 
Gang Membership and Violent Victimization: A Research Note, 26 JUST. Q. 625, 639–41 (2009). 
Related are several other points of empirical debate. First, some have claimed that laws entitling 
individuals to carry concealed firearms have produced reductions in crime. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, 
JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 170–336 (3d ed. 2010); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, 
Deterrence, and Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 64–65 (1997). This 
conclusion has been subject to fierce criticism. See, e.g., DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC 
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It seems to follow that police tactics to make it more difficult and risky 
for offenders to carry guns in public would reduce the risk of violent 
confrontation and increase the difficulties facing criminal enterprises 
engaged in violent competition. Indeed, there is something approaching 
consensus among criminologists that one of the very few interventions that 
consistently reduces rates of violent crime involves aggressive patrol 
targeting statistical concentrations of crime and focusing on finding 
guns.
293
 For this reason, I have elsewhere argued that an important factor 
 
 
HEALTH 100–04 (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
125–51 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); SPITZER, supra note 119, at 69–73; TUSHNET, supra 
note 222, at 85–95; Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less 
Crime HypothesisWith Some Help from Moody and Marvell, 6 ECON J. WATCH 35, 37–55 (2009). 
Even a leading firearms-rights advocate has pronounced the evidence in support of this theory 
unpersuasive. See Kleck, supra note 254, at 1411–15. In any event, even the advocates of this view 
make no claim that it applies in high-crime, urban neighborhoods where levels of drug- and gang-
related violence are common. As we have seen, for example, gang members and drug traffickers carry 
firearms at elevated rates but also experience elevated rates of homicide victimization. Similarly, the 
fact that permit-holders under existing schemes seem unlikely to commit crimes does not necessarily 
apply if a robust Second Amendment right ultimately made the right to carry available to a far broader 
class of individuals. A related claim is that firearms are used for defensive purposes at very high rates. 
See, e.g., GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 193–211 (1997). Other 
work has cast great doubt on this claim. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 8–
11 (1997); HEMENWAY, supra, at 66–69, 239–40; SPITZER, supra note 119, at 64–65. But again, even 
the advocates of this view do not claim that it operates to make high-crime neighborhoods safer. To 
the contrary, there is good reason to suspect that the prevalence of firearms in such neighborhoods, 
rather than producing a reduction in crime, has facilitated and produced the drive-by shooting, which is 
a common tactic of criminal street gangs. See, e.g., H. Range Hutson et al., Drive-by Shootings by 
Violent Street Gangs in Los Angeles: A Five-Year Review from 1989 to 1993, 3 ACAD. EMERGENCY 
MED. 300, 302–03 (1996); H. Range Hutson et al., Adolescents and Children Injured or Killed in 
Drive-by Shootings in Los Angeles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 324 (1994). When gang members 
believe that an intended target may be armed, they are more likely to employ this tactic because it 
enables them to both approach and leave the target quickly and enjoy the benefits of tactical surprise. 
See WILLIAM B. SANDERS, GANGBANGS AND DRIVE-BYS: GROUNDED CULTURE AND JUVENILE GANG 
VIOLENCE 65–74 (1994); James C. Howell, Youth Gangs: An Overview, in GANGS AT THE 
MILLENNIUM, supra note 284, at 16, 33–34. Finally, some argue that history suggests that racial and 
other minorities have found firearms of particular value for purposes of self-defense, although these 
claims are unaccompanied by empirical evidence that the use of firearms has enabled minorities to 
achieve acceptable (or even enhanced) levels of personal security. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & 
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 
GEO. L.J. 309, 349–58 (1991); Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An 
Assessment of Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491, 1516–53 (2013). The persistence of high 
rates of firearms-related crime and its contagion effects instead suggest a powerful argument to the 
contrary. 
 293. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 292, at 230–35; Blumstein & Wallman, supra 
note 286, at 136–37; Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN 
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 238–39 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003); 
Philip J. Cook, Anthony A. Braga & Mark H. Moore, Gun Control, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 
257, 280 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011); Jens Ludwig, Better Gun Enforcement, Less 
Crime, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 677, 701–08 (2005); Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Reducing 
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in New York City’s efforts at driving down violent crime so effectively is 
its restrictive gun-control laws, which are enforced through an aggressive 
stop-and-frisk regime targeting statistical hot spots of crime aimed at 
“suspicious bulges” and other indications that a suspect is unlawfully 
carrying firearms—tactics which effectively make it prohibitively risky to 
carry guns or drugs at hot spots.
294
 There is, in fact, substantial evidence 
that stop-and-frisk tactics targeting these statistical hot spots have played 
an important role in New York’s crime decline,295 even if there may be 
some evidence that in recent years, the tactic has perhaps reached, if not 
exceeded, the point of diminishing returns, at least in New York.
296
 
If the Second Amendment conferred a right to carry firearms in public, 
however, the ability to execute a stop-and-frisk strategy aimed at driving 
guns off the streetscape would be sharply circumscribed, if not altogether 
eliminated. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search 
and seizure, for example, permits the use of stop-and-frisk tactics only 
when an officer reasonably believes that criminal activity is afoot.
297
 If the 
Second Amendment granted individuals a right to carry firearms in public, 
the Fourth Amendment would necessarily prohibit search and seizure 
based on no more than reason to believe that an individual was armed.
298
 
 
 
Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 119, 126–30 
(2001); Lawrence W. Sherman, Reducing Gun Violence: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s 
Promising, in PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: 1999–2000 LECTURE SERIES 69, 78–79 (Nat’l 
Inst. of Justice, Dep’t of Justice, 2001); Lawrence W. Sherman & John E. Eck, Policing for Crime 
Prevention, in EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME PREVENTION 295, 308–10 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 
rev. 2006); Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot 
Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673, 675–86, 691–92 (1995); Cody W. Telep & David 
Weisburd, What Is Known About the Effectiveness of Police Practices in Reducing Crime and 
Disorder?, 15 POLICE Q. 331, 340–41 (2012).  
 294. See Rosenthal, supra note 56, at 39–44.  
 295. See, e.g., DENNIS C. SMITH & ROBERT PURTELL, AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S 
“OPERATION IMPACT”: A TARGETED ZONE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY 49–50 (2007); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS 
CONTROL 131–44 (2012); Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug 
Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 418, 
442–53 (2006); David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing 
Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength?: 
The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 146–149 
(2013). 
 296. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a 
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 349–53 (2011).  
 297. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269–74 (2000). 
 298. For an opinion discussing the potential of the Second Amendment to circumscribe stop-and-
frisk tactics directed at armed suspects, see United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 690–94 (7th Cir. 
2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For a general discussion of 
the potential for a robust conception of Second Amendment rights to constrain widespread policing 
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Even if a permit were required to carry firearms in public places, if the 
Second Amendment were understood to require that permits be made 
liberally available, the Fourth Amendment could well prohibit any form of 
investigative detention to determine if an individual, reasonably believed 
to be carrying firearms, had the proper permit, just as it forbids the police 
to stop vehicles to determine if the driver possesses the requisite license 
and registration.
299
 It is quite unclear, for example, that merely observing 
an armed individual in public, even in a high-crime area, would supply an 
adequate basis to stop and question that individual based on reasonable 
suspicion that he lacked the requisite permit. Even aside from these 
problems, a sophisticated criminal organization might be able to acquire 
permits authorizing some of its members to carry firearms in public. In 
short, a broad Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public would 
likely pose a substantial inhibition on the ability of the authorities to 
prevent violent crime by making it risky to carry guns in public and 
thereby to disrupt Fagan and Wilkinson’s “ecology of danger” in high-
crime neighborhoods.  
One can question, however, whether Heller has any application outside 
of the home. Heller indicates that the interest in lawful armed defense is 
particularly compelling in “the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.”300 Some commentators, stressing this 
language in Heller, as well as the enhanced regulatory interests that come 
 
 
tactics, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574230. 
 299. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655–63 (1979) (stops of vehicles to check license and 
registration violate the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause or at least reasonable 
suspicion that the driver does not have proper license and registration or has committed some other 
offense); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–48 (2000) (roadblocks in high-
crime areas where all vehicles are stopped and checked for guns and drugs violate the Fourth 
Amendment). Laws targeting possession or carrying of firearms by only convicted felons are also of 
limited efficacy. One leading study found that only about 43% of adult homicide offenders in Illinois 
had a prior felony conviction. See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Anthony A. Braga, Criminal Records 
of Homicide Offenders, 294 JAMA 598, 598 (2005). Another found that about 41% of adults arrested 
for felony homicide and just 30% of adults arrested for all felonies in Westchester County, New York 
had a prior felony conviction, and just 33% of all adults arrested for felonies in New York State had a 
prior felony conviction. See Philip J. Cook, Q&A on Firearms Availability, Carrying, and Misuse, 14 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N. GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 77, 80 (2012). Thus, even assuming officers on patrol can 
effectively enforce these laws by somehow identifying convicted felons on the streetscape through 
tactics consistent with the Fourth Amendment, these laws would permit many offenders to remain 
armed and, perhaps, even stimulate the recruitment of younger individuals without criminal records by 
drug traffickers and criminal street gangs.  
 300. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 1253 
 
 
 
 
into play when firearms are brought into public places, argue that Second 
Amendment rights do not extend outside the home.
301
  
Yet, as we have seen, there is some historical precedent for protecting 
the right to carry firearms in public, at least openly, although the evidence 
is in conflict, perhaps tainted by the prevalence of slavery in the South, 
and the rationale for distinguishing between open and concealed carry 
seems to have little contemporary application.
302
 In the face of this 
cacophony, the historical evidence that seemingly supports a right to carry 
firearms in public, at least openly, offers little in the way of a reliable basis 
for resolving the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the carrying of 
firearms in public.  
To be sure, a blanket ban on carrying firearms in public seems difficult 
to reconcile with Heller’s account of the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment. Heller concluded that the original meaning of the right to 
“bear” arms meant the right to “carry[] for a particular purpose—
confrontation.” Of course, many, if not most, “confrontations” occur 
outside the home; the most natural understanding of the right to “bear” or 
carry arms is not limited to the interior of the home. This inference is 
reinforced by Heller’s caution that its holding does not “cast doubt on . . . 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings.”303 This dictum, of course, suggests that, in 
locations other than “sensitive places,” the Second Amendment confers a 
right to carry firearms. 
As for the historical evidence, Judge Posner reached this conclusion:  
[A] right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the 
eighteenth century could not rationally have been limited to the 
home. Suppose one lived in what was then the wild west . . . . One 
would need from time to time to leave one’s home to obtain 
supplies from the nearest trading post, and en route one would be as 
much (probably more) at risk if unarmed as one would be in one’s 
home unarmed.
304
 
The import of this discussion in terms of original meaning is debatable; 
although arms were surely carried outside the home with frequency on the 
 
 
 301. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 231–33 (2008); Miller, supra note 153, at 1297–355. 
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 157–63. 
 303. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
 304. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). To similar effect, see Peruta v. Cnty. 
of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) ), reh’g granted 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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frontier, it is unclear whether this was regarded as a matter of right or 
merely because legislative restriction of the right to carry arms was 
regarded as unwarranted in unsettled areas. After all, in frontier towns, 
strict gun control often took hold.
305
 But, implicit in Judge Posner’s 
discussion is perhaps the most important reason to reject a view of Second 
Amendment rights that limits firearms to the home: Heller tells us that the 
Second Amendment codified a right of lawful armed defense, and the need 
to defend oneself is not limited to the home.
306
 
Still, one might question how much weight Heller should receive on 
this point. Recall that Heller sought only “to enjoin the city from enforcing 
the bar on the registration of handguns . . . and the trigger-lock 
requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of ‘functional firearms within 
the home.’”307 Accordingly, discussion in Heller of whether Second 
Amendment rights extend outside the home was dictum unnecessary to the 
decision. Beyond that, in response to the argument that the phrase “bear 
arms” was ambiguous because it often referred to carrying arms in military 
service, in Heller the Court concluded that this phrase “unequivocally bore 
that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition ‘against,’ 
which was in turn followed by the target of the hostilities.”308 
Significantly, this stops short of a claim that the phrase was unambiguous; 
indeed, the Court acknowledged that “the phrase was often used in a 
military context.”309 Even on the Court’s limited claim, Professor Cornell 
has argued that the historical evidence on this point was not nearly as clear 
as portrayed by the Court.
310
 One post-Heller review of the historical 
evidence identified ample evidence that the phrase “bear arms” often had a 
military meaning in the framing era, even when not followed by 
“against.”311  
 
 
 305. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 306. See, e.g., O’Shea, supra note 107, at 667–70; Pratt, supra note 180, at 554–56; Volokh, supra 
note 56, at 1516–19; Winkler, supra note 38, at 1569–71. 
 307. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
 308. Id. at 586. 
 309. Id. at 587. 
 310. See Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, 
Same as the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1109–10 (2009). For Professor Cornell’s pre-Heller 
assessment of the historical evidence regarding the original meaning of this phrase, see Saul Cornell, 
The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 
162–64 (2007). 
 311. See Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right To Bear 
Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUB. 585, 589–605 (2009); see also Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 
158 (1840) (“The words ‘bear arms,’ too, have reference to their military use, and were not employed 
to mean wearing them about the person as part of the dress.”). 
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Thus, in an appropriate case in which the contours of the right to “bear” 
arms are at issue, the Court may be warranted in revisiting the question 
whether the phrase “bear arms” is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant resort 
to the preamble as an interpretive aid. And, to the extent that the phrase 
“bear arms” is ambiguous, resort to the preamble is of particular 
importance to perform what Heller called the preamble’s “clarifying 
function.”312 This suggests that when it comes to the right to bear, or carry 
firearms—a right not squarely at issue in Heller—the regulatory authority 
contemplated by the preamble is of particular force.
313
 
In any event, as we have seen, the rationale supporting the nineteenth-
century distinction between concealed and open carry has little 
contemporary resonance. Since the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment, unlike the Seventh, does not preserve framing-era practice, 
legislatures should have the freedom to reach some other accommodation 
between the right and regulatory power than one based on a now-obsolete 
historical distinction between the dangers posed by concealed and open 
carry. A complete prohibition on carrying operable firearms in any public 
place renders the Second Amendment right to bear, or carry, firearms for 
self-defense nugatory, or nearly so, and might well be difficult to 
justify.
314
 But less complete prohibitions that require individuals to obtain 
a permit and demonstrate a particularized need to carry a firearm for self-
defense have been upheld by most courts to consider the question.
315
  
 
 
 312. Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.  
 313. This does not mean that Heller was necessarily wrong to recognize an individual right to bear 
arms outside of a military context. As Heller observed, treating the phrase “bear arms” as an idiomatic 
reference to the use of arms in a military context creates anomalies: 
 Giving “bear Arms” its idiomatic meaning would cause the protected right to consist of the 
right to be a soldier or to wage war—an absurdity that no commentator has ever endorsed. 
Worse still, the phrase “keep and bear Arms” would be incoherent. The word “Arms” would 
have two different meanings at once: “weapons” (as the object of “keep”) and (as the object 
of “bear”) one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying “He filled and kicked the 
bucket” to mean “He filled the bucket and died.”  
Id. at 586–87 (citation omitted). There is no anomaly, however, in relying on the preamble to inform 
the interpretation of the scope of the right to bear arms even in a nonmilitary context. As we have seen, 
Heller also concluded that the term “militia,” as it appeared in the preamble, referred to all citizens 
able to keep and bear arms and not only to the members of a formal military organization. Thus, the 
preamble does not compel the conclusion that only the carrying of firearms in connection with service 
in an organized militia is protected by the operative clause. 
 314. For judicial opinions reaching this conclusion, see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940–42 
(7th Cir. 2012), and People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 325–28 (Ill. 2013).  
 315. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435–40 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 
F.3d 865, 876–83 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89–101 (2d Cir. 
2012); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177–79 (Md. 2011); In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 757–62 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); In re Pantano, 60 A.3d 507, 511–14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2013); People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 2009); see also United States v. 
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On this point, however, judicial opinion is divided; a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that in a state where open carry is prohibited, San 
Diego’s policy allowing applicants to obtain a concealed-carry permit only 
on a showing of particularized need to carry firearms for self-defense 
violates the Second Amendment because it does not “allow[] the typical 
responsible, law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public for the lawful 
purpose of self-defense.”316 It added that “[t]he challenged regulation does 
no more to combat [the state’s public safety concerns] than would a law 
indiscriminately limiting the issuance of a permit to every tenth 
applicant.”317 The panel cautioned, however, that it “consider[ed] the 
scope of the right only with respect to responsible, law-abiding citizens,” 
adding that “[w]ith respect to irresponsible or non-law-abiding citizens, a 
different analysis—which we decline to undertake here—applies.”318 This 
qualification was presumably compelled by Heller’s admonition that it 
“d[id] not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to 
carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First 
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”319  
Yet, the panel’s claim that it need not concern itself with the question 
whether “irresponsible or non-law abiding citizens” might carry firearms if 
all applicants must be given permits without any special showing of need 
misses the point of prophylactic regulation. While the criminal history of 
an applicant for a carry permit can be readily ascertained, whether he is a 
“responsible, law abiding citizen,” as well as the actual “purpose” for 
which he seeks to carry, are not so easy to know. There is, of course, a 
considerable likelihood that some individuals who are not “responsible, 
law-abiding citizens” will obtain concealed-carry permits if permits must 
be issued to anyone not disqualified by a prior conviction and who 
 
 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding statute prohibiting loaded handguns in 
vehicles within a national park); Chief of Police of Worcester v. Holden, 26 N.E.3d 715, 726–28 
(Mass. 2015) (upholding statute providing that “suitable” persons be licensed to carry concealed 
firearms); Charlie Sarosy, Comment, California’s Unloaded Open Carry Bans: A Constitutional and 
Risky, but Perhaps Necessary, Gun Control Strategy, 61 UCLA L. REV. 464, 488–98 (2014) (arguing 
that a prohibition on open carry without a permit, with an exception for individuals facing a specific 
and immediate threat, is constitutional). 
 316. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted 781 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205, 225–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
(upholding a permit requirement for concealed carry in a state that bans open carry, but stressing that 
permits are liberally available). 
 317. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 474–75 (D. 
Md. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876–83 (4th Cir. 2013)) (second 
brackets in original).  
 318. Id. at 1150 n.2. 
 319. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
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proclaims a generalized desire to carry firearms for self-defense.
320
 This is 
precisely the context in which the case for prophylactic regulation is 
strongest, given the inevitable error rate that inheres in any effort to make 
predictive judgments about persons who wish to carry firearms in public, 
especially when applicants proclaim only a generalized and conclusory 
interest in carrying firearms for lawful purposes. Carrying firearms in 
public, moreover, represents the context in which the safety of third parties 
is most plainly implicated. And, as we have seen, both the Second 
Amendment’s preamble and the history of firearms regulation suggest that 
the right to bear arms permits a wide variety of prophylactic regulations 
and argues for a measure of deference to legislative assessments of the 
efficacy of and justification for such regulation.  
Using a showing of particularized need protects Second Amendment 
rights in cases in which the core constitutional interest in lawful self-
defense is most plainly implicated, supplying an administrable basis to 
decide whether applicants are likely to be “responsible, law-abiding 
citizens,” while denying applications that present substantial risk of error. 
This criterion is probably as reliable as the nineteenth-century criterion of 
requiring open carry to determine the likely purpose for which firearms are 
carried and a good deal better suited to the contemporary urban landscape. 
Although prohibiting only concealed carry may have been a reasonable 
approach to identifying those individuals most likely to be carrying 
firearms for an improper purpose in the nineteenth century, that rationale 
has little contemporary application.
321
 And a constitutional requirement 
that licenses must be liberally granted could well produce potent Fourth 
Amendment limitations on the ability of the authorities to stop armed 
individuals and determine whether they are properly licensed, further 
undermining prophylactic policing.
322
  
Equally important, the view that rigorous permit requirements operate 
as a rationing system fails to acknowledge that when the law enables 
police to keep guns off the streets in high-crime urban hot spots, the 
likelihood of violent confrontations that prove fatal is reduced. In these 
areas, it may be effectively impossible to have a “well regulated militia” if 
everyone expressing a generalized interest in carrying firearms for self-
defense, who is not disqualified by a prior conviction, can carry firearms 
 
 
 320. As we have seen, the available data indicates that most homicide offenders, for example, do 
not have prior felony convictions. See supra note 299. 
 321. See supra text accompanying notes 156–63. 
 322. See supra text accompanying notes 297–99. 
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“in case of confrontation.”323 Conversely, a system in which either open or 
concealed carry must be permitted could prove constitutionally vulnerable 
precisely because it might do little to keep guns off the streets and thereby 
reduce firearms-related crime, at least if the Second Amendment is 
understood—not unreasonably—to require that a challenged enactment 
make some meaningful contribution to public safety.
324
  
Especially in high-crime jurisdictions riven by gang and drug crime, 
carrying firearms in public may be accompanied by unacceptable risks, 
and for that reason, warrant prophylactic restriction.
325
 Indeed, there is a 
long tradition of more restrictive firearms regulation in urban areas.
326
 If 
the Second Amendment permitted the development of concealed-carry 
prohibitions directed at those who carried firearms under circumstances 
that were thought to pose unacceptable risks, surely the Second 
Amendment also permits regulations directed at what are properly 
regarded, under contemporary conditions, as circumstances posing 
unacceptable risk. Given the difficulty in assessing the purpose of 
someone carrying firearms in public, a requirement that an individual be 
licensed and demonstrate some special need to carry the firearm serves a 
far more important public purpose than the now largely outdated judgment 
that law-abiding persons are more likely to engage in open and not 
concealed carry. Such an approach has the added benefit of preserving the 
ability of the police to take action to stop and search individuals who they 
reasonably suspect to be unlawfully armed and dangerous. This is the kind 
of “discipline” to which a well-regulated militia would surely submit. 
* * * 
Dissenting from the Court’s decision to apply the Second Amendment 
to the state and local gun-control laws in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
327
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Justice Stevens wrote: “[F]irearms have a fundamentally ambivalent 
relationship to liberty. Just as they can help homeowners defend their 
families and property from intruders, they can help thugs and 
insurrectionists murder innocent victims.”328 One need not agree with 
Justice Stevens’s ultimate conclusion in McDonald to acknowledge his 
point. Heller upheld a Second Amendment right to carry firearms, but 
sentencing enhancements for criminals who carry firearms have been 
invariably upheld as well.
329
 It is hard to think of any other constitutional 
right the exercise of which could be used as a sentencing enhancement, yet 
this result seems entirely consistent with Heller’s admonition that the 
Second Amendment “[i]s not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”330 
Heller’s originalism confirms the linkage between right and regulation, 
but it offers little more aid in evaluating the justification for a challenged 
regulation under circumstances so radically different from those that 
prevailed at the framing. A largely nonoriginalist common law of the 
Second Amendment must inevitably develop to reconcile right and 
regulation in twenty-first century America. That process is already well 
under way in the lower courts. 
All that said, history tells us something important about the Second 
Amendment. Firearms rights and regulation have always been twinned: in 
the English Bill of Rights; the Second Amendment’s preamble and 
operative clause; and in the evolving history of firearms regulation. 
Indeed, no right is more Janus-faced than the right to keep and bear arms. 
Thus goes the constitutional case for gun control. 
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